University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2021

AI in Adjudication and Administration
Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Lavi M. Ben Dor
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Law
Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Public Administration Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Repository Citation
Coglianese, Cary and Ben Dor, Lavi M., "AI in Adjudication and Administration" (2021). Faculty Scholarship
at Penn Law. 2118.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2118

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

AI in Adjudication and Administration
Cary Coglianese† & Lavi M. Ben Dor††
Artificial intelligence (AI) has begun to permeate many
aspects of U.S. society.1 In settings as varied as medicine,
transportation, financial services, and entertainment, new digital
technologies that rely on machine-learning algorithms to process
vast quantities of data are making highly accurate predictions that
often outperform humans in executing important tasks.2 As a
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1 Although a variety of definitions for the term “artificial intelligence” exist, a
helpful one is “[t]he theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks
normally requiring human intelligence.” Artificial Intelligence, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095426960 [https://per
ma.cc/G6VX-AX6B]. The terms “machine learning” and “artificial intelligence” are to some
extent interchangeable and are used as such throughout this article. Cf. Cary Coglianese &
David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (2019)
(“By ‘artificial intelligence’ and ‘machine learning,’ we refer . . . to a broad approach to
predictive analytics captured under various umbrella terms . . . . For our purposes, we need
not parse differences in the meaning of these terms, nor will we delve deeply into specific
techniques within machine learning.”). For further discussion of how we define machine
learning throughout this article, see infra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Using Machine Learning to Improve the U.S.
Government, REG. REV. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/08/12/coglianeseusing-machine-learning-to-improve-us-government [https://perma.cc/PZD9-NTUG]; Peter
Dizikes, AI, the Law, and Our Future, MIT NEWS OFF. (Jan. 18, 2019),
http://news.mit.edu/2019/first-ai-policy-congress-0118 [https://perma.cc/4B38-2A2B]; Jillian
D’Onfro, AI 50: America’s Most Promising Artificial Intelligence Companies, FORBES (Sept. 17,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jilliandonfro/2019/09/17/ai-50-americas-most-promisingartificial-intelligence-companies/#54bfb84c565c [https://perma.cc/EV4Z-NC5A]; Chris Weller,
A California Police Department is Using Software to Decide if You’re About to Commit a Crime,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/intrado-beware-system-tracksthreat-levels-2016-1 [https://perma.cc/2VMZ-C5XJ] (“A new piece of software in place at the
Fresno Police Department in central California uses huge batches of data, ranging from criminal
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result, the potential utility of artificial intelligence in the legal field
has not gone unnoticed, with scholars, attorneys, and judges
beginning to examine the implications of these digital technologies
for the U.S. legal system.3
This article seeks to capture the state of the art in current
uses of digitization, algorithmic tools, and machine learning in
domestic governance in the United States. It serves as a status
report on nonmilitary governmental uses of artificial intelligence
and its building blocks throughout state and federal courts and
agencies.4 With responsibility for domestic governance divided in a
federalist structure across fifty-one governments—fifty states plus
history to Twitter feeds, to assess how likely someone is to commit a crime and whether the
police ought to keep tabs on them.”). Artificial intelligence tools have even proven useful in the
fight against COVID-19. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIH Harnesses AI for
COVID-19 Diagnosis, Treatment, and Monitoring (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/newsevents/news-releases/nih-harnesses-ai-covid-19-diagnosis-treatment-monitoring [https://perma
.cc/2GFW-63CA].
3 See, e.g., Jens Frankenreiter & Michael A. Livermore, Computational Methods
in Legal Analysis, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 39 (2020) (discussing how computational
advances may affect legal interpretation); Daniel L. Chen, Machine Learning and the Rule of
Law 4–7 (Working Paper, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3302507 [https://perma.cc/7E8F-NSBS] (noting that machine learning may be useful in
detecting and adjusting for bias in judicial decision-making on asylum requests); Harry
Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305, 1328 (2019)
(discussing implications of having “AI-enabled computer systems . . . make their way into
various facets of the legal system”).
4 We do not address military and security intelligence-gathering uses of AI
both because they present distinctive policy implications beyond the scope of this article
and because they may well be subject to security classification. For an in-depth, nonclassified treatment of artificial intelligence in U.S. military applications, however, see
PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF WAR
(2018). We also do not address in this article the use of AI tools by legislatures, mainly
because such use “remains something of a next frontier.” Monika Zalnieriute et al., From
Rule of Law to Statute Drafting: Legal Issues for Algorithms in Government DecisionMaking, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS: HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GOVERNMENT REGULATION 251–72 (Woodrow Barfield ed.,
2021). AI tools make concrete, individual forecasts, which more naturally make them
conducive to adjudicatory and administrative contexts where individualized
determinations must be made. As one of us has noted elsewhere, “[a] bit more technical
imagination and advancement may be required for machine learning to usher in
automatic regulation”—or, for similar reasons, legislation. Coglianese & Lehr, supra
note 1, at 9. That said, public support for such use may be growing. In one very small
survey, at least forty percent of Americans reportedly favored replacing some of their
legislators with AI systems (and fifty-one percent and seventy-five percent of the
European and Chinese populations, respectively, did as well). Sam Shead, More than
Half of Europeans Want to Replace Lawmakers with AI, Study Says, CNBC (May 27,
2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/27/ europeans-want-to-replace-lawmakers-withai.html [https://perma.cc/56X7-PAQX]. Although the actual replacement of legislators with AI
tools may be some time away, the involvement of legislatures in overseeing and crafting rules
about the use of AI by others, including by courts and administrative agencies, is clearly already
in taking place. See, e.g., State Artificial Intelligence Policy, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/state-policy/ai/ [https://perma.cc/6V2J-EGU5]; Legislation Related to Artificial
Intelligence, Nat’l Con. St. Legislatures, https://www.ncsl.org/research/ telecommunications-andinformation-technology/2020-legislation-related-to-artificial-intelligence.aspx [https://perm
a.cc/2Q6Y-A7BR].
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the national government—the scope of this article’s coverage is
vast.5 Its subject matter is also a rapidly changing one.
As new technologies and applications emerge in the private
sector, both pressures and opportunities for the use of those
technologies in public-sector settings continue to grow. The vast
scope and fast pace of algorithmic governance make important the
kind of stock-taking that this article provides. To assess the value
that artificial intelligence holds, as well as to identify opportunities
for its application in domestic governance, it is important to
understand where and how AI is currently being used. Such a
stock-taking can also facilitate future research evaluating current
applications and generating recommendations for the diffusion of
artificial intelligence in new settings.
An account of the use of AI in government is also valuable
because there currently exists no centralized repository of
applications of artificial intelligence by courts and administrative
agencies.6 Given the federalist structure of the United States, the
development and implementation of AI technology in the public
sector is also not determined by any central institution.
Technology decisions are made at the federal level in as many as
several hundred separate administrative agencies.7 The number
of comparable agencies at the state and local level surely runs
into the tens of thousands. Even with respect simply to law
enforcement agencies, it has been noted that “the decentralized,
fragmented, and local nature of law enforcement in the United
States makes it challenging to accurately count the number of
agencies.”8
5 See generally, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive
Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law,
Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692
(2001).
6 One effort to provide such a repository can be found on the Penn Program
on Regulation’s website on “Optimizing Government.” Uses in Government, PENN LAW:
OPTIMIZING
GOVERNMENT,
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/ppr/optimizinggovernment-project/government.php#municipal [https://perma.cc/SS39-4FJ6]. Another
such project, which documents dozens of uses by local and state government agencies, is
the Data-Smart City Solutions initiative run by Harvard University. A Catalog of Civic
Data Use Cases, DATA-SMART CITY SOLS. (Apr. 9, 2021), https://datasmart.ash.harva
rd.edu/news/article/how-can-data-and-analytics-be-used-to-enhance-city-operations-723
[https://perma.cc/65WG-878Z].
7 Indeed, just getting a count of the number of federal agencies is difficult. One
scholarly report published by a governmental agency noted that “there is no authoritative list of
government agencies. Every list of federal agencies in government publications is different.”
DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES
14–15 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Sourcebook-2012-Final_12Dec_Online.pdf [https://perma.cc/CXL5-6UVA] (reporting estimates of the number of federal
administrative agencies that range from 252 to 405).
8 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT
DATA 1 (Oct. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX8SNR3S]. As a rough estimate of the number of law enforcement agencies, we note that
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Decisions about digital technologies used by courts
throughout the United States are similarly made by a plethora
of institutions and actors. The federal court system comprises,
in addition to one Supreme Court, a total of thirteen “circuits” in
the federal appellate court system and ninety-four trial court
“districts” (each with as many as dozens of trial judges, for a
total number of more than 650 courtrooms).9 At the state level,
the number of different courts proliferates even further—
especially given that state governments further delegate their
domestic authority to county and municipal governments that
have their own courts. According to the National Center for
State Courts, approximately 15,000 to 17,000 different state and
municipal courts exist in the United States.10
Any one of these numerous judicial or administrative
entities could in principle have its own policy with respect to
electronic filing, digitization of documents, or the use of
algorithms to support decision-making.11 As a result, it is
valuable for decision-makers in any of these settings, as well as
scholars and practitioners, to have a source that catalogs current
uses of artificial intelligence and its building blocks across the
United States. Of course, any such survey of uses must be made
with appropriate caution. As much as we have attempted to be
exhaustive in cataloging domestic uses of AI, we can make no
claim to have identified every use by any governmental entity.
This article is based primarily on extensive searches of academic
literature and media publications in our effort to identify current
uses of machine-learning algorithms that aid decision-making
within courts and agencies at both state and federal levels of
government. We also spoke with court and agency officials who
would be in a position to know about current uses of artificial
intelligence and its building blocks by governmental entities,
and we made contact with leading consultants and academic
approximately 18,000 different police departments and other law enforcement agencies
responded to a federally sponsored Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies in
2008. Id.
9 See, e.g., Court Role and Structure, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/aboutfederal-courts/court-role-and-structure [https://perma.cc/EG2Q-NZPM].
10 This estimate is based on a telephone and email exchange with NCSC staff,
and it includes a vast number of municipal courts. Indeed, the uncertainty reflected in
the range (rather than a point estimate) is apparently due to fairly regular changes in
the size and organization of municipal courts.
11 See, e.g., U.S. SUPREME COURT, RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EC9HS4J]; FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a) (“[A] district court, acting by a majority of its district judges, may
adopt and amend rules governing its practice.”); FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1) (“Each court of appeals
acting by a majority of its judges in regular active service may . . . make and amend rules
governing its practice.”).
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experts who are developing and studying such possible uses. Our
research effort has produced a survey, as comprehensive as any
we know, of judicial and administrative uses of machine learning
across federal and state governments in the United States.12
The results of our research lead us to be confident in two
overarching conclusions. First, no judicial or administrative
body in the United States has yet instituted a system that
provides for total decision-making by algorithm, such that a
computer makes a fully independent determination (that is, a
human “out of the loop” decision).13 Second, we are aware of no
court that is currently relying in any way, even on a human-inthe-loop basis, on what we would consider to be machinelearning algorithms. That said, one state has a parole board
using a system based on a machine-learning algorithm to
support prisoner release decisions, and numerous other
administrative agencies at the state and federal levels have
deployed or are currently researching the use of machine
learning in support of various administrative functions.14
In this article, we distinguish machine-learning algorithms—
which we treat here as defining artificial intelligence—from two
building blocks that might help lead to the eventual governmental
use of artificial intelligence: digitization and algorithmic tools.
Indeed, machine learning resides on the far end of a spectrum of
digital technologies available to governments.
The closest point on that spectrum begins with simple
digitization—or the use of electronic filing or other data systems to
manage information in electronic format. Digitization is a building
block toward artificial intelligence because it can facilitate the
availability of the “big data” on which machine learning is based.
Next on the spectrum would be for governments to rely on
what we call algorithmic tools—that is, traditional statistical
models, indices, or scoring systems that are used as decision tools.
12 Other such efforts have produced excellent resources on AI use by
governments, but have tended to have a more limited scope, either institutionally (e.g.,
only focused on agencies) or on one level of government (e.g., federal). See, e.g., DAVID
FREEMAN ENGSTROM ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD8M-M98T]; HILA
MEHR, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR CITIZEN SERVICES AND GOVERNMENT (2017),
https://ash.harvard.edu/files/ash/files/artificial_intelligence_for_citizen_services.pdf
[https://perma.cc/79GT-GE6Q]. Of course, we cannot claim that we have ourselves
identified or discussed in this article all of the uses of AI by governmental bodies in
the United States, especially in such a fast-moving domain as information technology.
13 For a discussion of the difference between using algorithms on a supportive
versus determinative basis, see Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 1, at 31, and Cary Coglianese
& David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the MachineLearning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1167–70 (2017).
14 See infra notes 43, 138–188 and accompanying text.
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These traditional algorithmic or statistical tools rely on humans to
select the specific variables to be included in a decision aid and the
precise mathematical relationships between those variables.15
Only at the final step of the spectrum—machine
learning—do governments rely on tools that constitute what we
consider here to be artificial intelligence. Machine-learning
algorithms essentially work “on their own” to process data and
discover optimal mathematical relationships between them.
These algorithms can take many forms, but in essence machine
learning refers to an algorithm’s autonomous ability to detect
patterns in large amounts of data. This functionality gives
machine-learning algorithms not only their name but also their
often superior performance in predictive accuracy over
traditional, human-guided algorithmic tools.
Of course, even with machine learning, humans must
specify the objective that the learning algorithm is supposed to
forecast or optimize, then collect the data on which the algorithm
will “learn,” and ultimately specify the general computational
properties or architecture that the algorithm will deploy.16
Often, humans will also undertake a number of steps to “train”
the algorithm and refine its operation.
Yet machine-learning algorithms are different than
traditional statistical tools because the precise ways in which data
are combined and analyzed are not fully determined in advance by
a human analyst. These algorithms are also typically not as
intuitively explainable after the fact. For this reason, machinelearning algorithms are often described as “black-box” algorithms.
They do not afford a ready way of characterizing exactly how they
work—that is, which variables matter and how those variables are
weighed for any given output—even though the outputs can be quite
accurate in terms of achieving or optimizing the objectives that the
algorithms have been designed to achieve.17
15 A typical example of a traditional statistical tool would be ordinary least squares
regression analysis, where a human selects the variables and the functional form of the model.
Admittedly, some computer scientists might well consider even conventional regression
analysis as a type of “machine” learning because a statistical software package computes the
coefficients in the model. But what we and others mean by machine learning refers to
nonparametric models or algorithms that do not involve a human in expressly specifying the
model’s functional form or even at times the precise variables to use in generating a predictive
output. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 13, at 1156–59.
16 For an excellent primer on machine learning, see David Lehr & Paul Ohm,
Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 669 (2017).
17 For helpful discussions of some of the challenges associated with explaining
outputs of machine-learning algorithms, see P. Jonathon Phillips et al., Four Principles
of Explainable Artificial Intelligence (Aug. 2020), https://www.nist.gov/system/files/
documents/2020/08/17/NIST%20Explainable%20AI%20Draft%20NISTIR8312%20%281
%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZGB5-L5TS], and Lehr & Ohm, supra note 16, at 705–10.
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In Part I of this article, we take up the status of artificial
intelligence in the federal and state judiciaries. More precisely, we
report on three building blocks that might eventually lead to the use
of artificial intelligence in the courts: the increased digitization of
court records; the use of algorithmic tools for risk assessment in
aspects of the criminal justice process; and the growth of online
dispute resolution outside of and parallel to the courts. The most
widespread technological innovation in the courts in recent years
has manifested in the use of various forms of digitization (such as
electronic filing and case management), while some courts have
relied on algorithmic tools to support pretrial, sentencing, or parole
decisions. Some courts also recognize a role for online dispute
resolution systems developed by the private sector.
We turn in Part II to a review of administrative agencies’
uses of artificial intelligence. Many administrative systems have
been digitized for some time, and administrative agencies have
also long relied on traditional statistical analysis or algorithmic
tools.18 But most relevant to the purposes of this article, some
administrative agencies at the local, state, and federal levels are
also starting to use machine-learning algorithms for certain
analytical and decision support purposes. We thus devote our
attention in Part II to these latter uses of machine learning in
the administrative context.
In both parts of this article, we also highlight some of the
legal issues, and at times the litigation and public controversy, that
have surrounded certain applications of algorithmic tools or
machine learning. Given the increased use of artificial intelligence
in other facets of society, as well as in many other parts of the
world, greater governmental reliance on machine learning in the
United States will likely continue to increase. At some point in the
18 Government’s use of digital computing emerged following World War II. A
Brief History of the U.S. Federal Government and Innovation, INSIGHT (Aug. 1, 2011),
https://insight.ieeeusa.org/articles/a-brief-history-of-the-u-s-federal-government-andinnovation-part-iii-1945-and-beyond/
[https://perma.cc/SV3C-2V97];
Kenneth
L.
Kraemer & John Leslie King, Management Science and Information Technologies in U.S.
Local Governments: A Review of Use and Impact, 7 COMPUT. ENV. URB. SYS. 7 (1982).
The use of digital computing to perform domestic administrative tasks had permeated
government in earnest starting in the 1970s, and by the 1990s it expanded further
following the advent of the internet. See DARRELL M. WEST, DIGITAL GOVERNMENT:
TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE (2005); JANE FOUNTAIN, BUILDING THE
VIRTUAL STATE: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2001). For
further discussion, see infra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. When it comes to
traditional statistical analysis, various types of legal and administrative decisions have
been informed by the use of such tools over the last century. It was in 1897, after all,
that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., opined that, although “the black-letter [lawyer] may be
the [lawyer] of the present, . . . the [lawyer] of the future is the [expert] of statistics and
the master of economics.” Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law,10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
469 (1897).
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not-too-distant future, autonomous decision-making systems
based on machine learning may well begin to take the place of a
government singularly and literally “of the people” and “by the
people” in the United States.19
I.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BUILDING BLOCKS IN
THE COURTS

As of today, we know of no machine-learning tool that has
been adopted in any court in the United States to make an
ultimate, fully automated determination on a legal or factual
question.20 However, several emerging trends in recent years
signal movement towards what may be the eventual use of
automated adjudication via artificial intelligence. To date, the
principal building blocks of artificial intelligence in the courts
comprise the digitization of court filings and processes, the
introduction of algorithmic tools for certain criminal court
decisions, and the emergence of online dispute resolution as an
alternative to traditional court proceedings for small claims.
A.

Digitization of Court Records

Artificial intelligence depends on data.21 Increasingly,
court systems in the United States have made data more easily
accessible through the growing digitization of court documents.22
19 Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery of
Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863).
20 See Richard C. Kraus, Artificial Intelligence Invades Appellate Practice: The
Here, The Near, and The Oh My Dear, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/appellate_issues/2019/winter/artificial-int
elligence-invades-appellate-practice-the-here-the-near-and-the-oh-my-dear/ [https://pe
rma.cc/58HE-NAWP] (noting that in the United States, “the more fantastic ideas such
as using AI to objectively decide cases by analyzing facts and applying law . . . are still
figments of creative imaginations”).
21 See Willem Sundblad, Data Is the Foundation for Artificial Intelligence and
Machine Learning, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/willemsundblad
europe/2018/10/18/data-is-the-foundation-for-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/4bd8c64051b4 [https://perma.cc/V43E-H8EU] (“[D]ata is both the most underutilized asset of
manufacturers and the foundational element that makes AI so powerful.”).
22 See, e.g., Jenni Bergal, Courts Plunge into the Digital Age, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.:
STATELINE (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2014/12/8/ courts-plunge-into-the-digital-age [https://perma.cc/2U44-PMVV] (noting that the
status of courthouses’ digital use “has been changing dramatically in many courthouses across
the country. States are moving to systems in which documents are submitted electronically, file
rooms are disappearing and the judicial system is going paperless”); Records/Document
Management Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Tech
nology/Records-Document-Management/Resource-Guide.aspx [https://perma.cc/VR52-3VFN]
(“Records and document management are at the core of most courts’ business
processes . . . . [M]any state courts have implemented electronic court records (ECR) and
electronic data management systems (EDMS) in an effort to improve court operations and
manage unruly paperwork.”).
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This digitization has in large part been internally driven by the
courts. Courts at both the state and federal level, including the
Supreme Court itself, have authorized electronic filing as one of
several ways a party can submit motions or arguments to a
court, or they have required it as the only method of submitting
filings.23 In addition, virtually every state and the federal
government posts free forms online that can be downloaded and
used by litigants.24 Some courts have created “dedicated
computer kiosks” specifically designed to help litigants who lack
legal representation.25 In California, for example, an “‘Online
Self-Help Center’ offers PDFs that can be filled in online and
used for evictions, divorces, orders of protection, collection
matters, small claims, and other issues.”26
The federal judiciary has instituted an electronic case
management system known as the Case Management/Electronic
Case Files (CM/ECF) system that allows for convenient filing and
organization of court documents, party pleadings, and other
relevant materials.27 In 2002, Congress directed the federal courts
to ensure that, with exceptions for certain documents filed under
seal, “any document that is filed electronically [is also] publicly
available online.”28 State and local courts have increasingly rolled
out various electronic filing (or “e-filing”) software to replace paper
submissions and docketing.29 In Florida alone, individuals filed
23 See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 29 (requiring that in addition to filing documents with
the Court Clerk, “all filers who are represented by counsel must submit documents to
the [Supreme] Court’s electronic filing system”); 7TH CIR. R. 25 (“All documents must be
filed and served electronically.”); E.D. PA. LOCAL R. 5.1.2 (“All civil and criminal cases
filed in this court are required to be entered into the court’s Electronic Case Filing
(“ECF”) System . . . .”); CAL. R. CT. 2.253 (empowering courts to permit or require
electronic filing).
24 Self Representation, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/Top
ics/Access-and-Fairness/Self-Representation/State-Links.aspx?cat=Court%20Forms
[https://perma.cc/4MVL-6X55].
25 BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING JUSTICE 123 (2017).
26 Id. at 119. Barton and Bibas report that in a single year more than four
million people visited the California self-help portal. They also report successful
experiences with other systems for “DIY” lawyering, such as a system in New York State.
Id. at 119–23.
27 Case Management/Electronic Case Files, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov
/cmecf/ [https://perma.cc/8AUY-S4A2]. Public access to PACER data is not free, which has
generated some controversy. See, e.g., David Post, Yes, PACER Stinks . . . But Is It Also
Overcharging Its Customers?, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/01/09/yes-pacer-stinks-but-is-it-also-overcharg
ing-its-customers/?utm_term=.49cf19383d86 [https://perma.cc/XG8X-EEHP]. Similar concerns
have been expressed related to the video recording of judicial proceedings. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Sherman, End the Supreme Court’s Ban on Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/opinion/open-the-supreme-court-to-cameras.html
[https://perma.cc/2V3S-P8LZ].
28 E-Government Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 347, § 205(c)(1), 116 Stat. 2899, 2914.
29 Electronic Filing, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Tech
nology/Electronic-Filing/State-Links.aspx [https://perma.cc/B4H6-VXC8]. For examples of state
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roughly 23.5 million documents totaling about 110 million pages
from mid-2018 to mid-2019.30 These systems have created massive
repositories of filings from litigants, as well as judicial decisions
and orders, all held in centralized databases.
In principle, artificial intelligence could take advantage of all
this data.31 At private law firms, the increasing use of algorithmic
tools, including those relying on machine-learning algorithms,
supports the review of documents during the discovery process. This
“e-discovery” practice has been shown to have a “strong impact” on
reducing the need for human labor—and it has spawned services
that seek to analyze trends and make legal forecasts.32
In addition, artificial intelligence has been used by outside
researchers in an attempt to predict courts’ decisions using data. In
a 2017 study, a machine-learning statistical model correctly
predicted the outcome of seventy percent of 28,000 U.S. Supreme
Court decisions and seventy-two percent of individual Justices’
votes from 1816 to 2015.33 With a growing amount of data available
from courts at all levels across the country, and demands for courts
to facilitate widespread public access to case records,34 it is likely
that such predictive efforts will only improve in the future. In time,
it may also be possible that artificial intelligence tools will have
gained enough “experience” in document review to step into the role
court “e-filing” systems, see eCourts, N.J. CTS., https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/ecourts.htm
[https://perma.cc/54GH-E3X8]; Electronic Filing in the Delaware Judiciary, DEL. CTS.,
https://courts.delaware.gov/efiling/ [https://perma.cc/S8GP-TZLL]; Active Courts, ODYSSEY
EFILEGA, http://www.odysseyefilega.com/active-courts.htm [https://perma.cc/2V2Y-8FG2];
EFILETEXAS, https://www.efiletexas.gov/ [https://perma.cc/4Z73-NS9U]; Superior Court
Electronic Case Filing, N.H. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.courts.state.nh.us/nh-e-court-p
roject/superior-attorneys.htm [https://perma.cc/B3WH-637M] (noting that e-filing in the
New Hampshire Superior Court became mandatory in September 2018).
30 2018-2019 Annual Statistics, FLA. CTS. E-FILING PORTAL (June 25, 2019),
https://www.flcourts.org/Publications-Statistics/Publications/2018-19-Annual-Report
[https://perma.cc/Q24Q-HDUX].
31 In fact, a project out of Northwestern University, the Systematic Content
Analysis of Litigation Events (SCALES) initiative, is currently working to use large sets
of data from court records to develop AI tools that can facilitate greater analysis of the
workings of the federal judiciary. See SCALES, https://scales-okn.org/ [https://perma.
cc/AM9Y-ZXQU].
32 See, e.g., Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers: Computers,
Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 515–16 (2017). Various private
sector efforts are underway to make use of court data for predictive analytic purposes. One
service is Lex Machina, https://lexmachina.com/ [https://perma.cc/B9JD-2682], which is used by
law firms. Another service, Docket Navigator, http://brochure.docketnavigator.com/
[https://perma.cc/4MXB-G44L], performs basic analytics (albeit not machine learning) in
intellectual property cases.
33 See Matthew Hutson, Artificial Intelligence Prevails at Predicting Supreme
Court Decisions, SCIENCE (May 2, 2017), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/05/artifi
cial-intelligence-prevails-predicting-supreme-court-decisions [https://perma.cc/XT6UTU24].
34 See, e.g., Open Courts Act of 2021, S. 2614, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (1st Session 2021)
(seeking to eliminate the fees charged for access to federal court records).
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of judges. Rather than just predicting judicial outcomes, perhaps
these tools will use the large troves of data available in electronic
filing systems to help in making actual judicial determinations. Such
a step would, of course, mark a considerable transformation in how
judicial functions are performed, presenting potential implications
for lawyering, judging, and public attitudes toward the courts.35
B.

Risk Assessment Algorithms

Algorithmic tools have taken root in some court
systems at least as aids to human decision-making in criminal
cases with respect to questions of bail, sentencing, and parole.
But so far, virtually none of these tools appear to rely on
machine-learning algorithms.
An algorithmic tool for bail decisions before trial that was
originally developed by the Arnold Foundation has now been
adopted by at least four states (Arizona, Kentucky, New Jersey,
and Utah) and about a dozen municipal courts, largely in major
metropolitan areas.36 According to a recent report by two media
justice advocacy organizations, all but four states have
apparently adopted some kind of risk assessment formula or aid
in sentencing decisions.37 More than half of the states use some
35 In a judiciary more reliant on AI tools to adjudicate disputes, systems that can sift
through data and help make decisions could ultimately make the legal profession less laborintensive, requiring fewer humans to review and analyze the thousands of documents that can
be produced in the lifecycle of a case—thus potentially reducing the number of lawyers and
support staff needed to handle the litigation process. See, e.g., Remus & Levy, supra note 32, at
535–36 (predicting that the adoption of advanced legal technology all at once would reduce
attorney hours by thirteen percent, or by two and one-half percent a year if adopted over the
course of five years); Anthony E. Davis, The Future of Law Firms (and Lawyers) in the Age of
Artificial Intelligence, 27 PROF. LAW. 3, 6 (2020) (“The drudge work traditionally done by new
lawyers is already vanishing and will ultimately disappear almost entirely.”). In addition, future
automation of various judicial tasks could affect the nature or quality of court decisions and
litigants’ experiences interacting with the judiciary. For various perspectives on such a potential
future, see, for example, Benjamin Minhao Chen et al., Having Your Day in Robot Court (UCLA
Sch. of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 21-20, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3841534 [https://perma.cc/6ZCU-MC3F], KATHERINE B. FORREST,
WHEN MACHINES CAN BE JUDGE, JURY, AND EXECUTIONER: JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE (2021), Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Will Robot Judges Change Litigation
and Settlement Outcomes?, MIT COMPUTATIONAL L. REP. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://law.mit.
edu/pub/willrobotjudgeschangelitigationandsettlementoutcomes/release/1 [https://perma.cc/LQ8Y
-22PH], Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 105 VA. L. REV. 611 (2020), Eugene Volokh,
Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L. J. 1135 (2019), and Andrea L. Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO.
L. J. 1245 (2016).
36 See ARNOLD VENTURES, PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT FAQS (“PSA 101”) (Mar. 18,
2019), https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/Public-Safety-Assessment-101_1903
19_140124.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ6X-ZUYU].
37 National Landscape, MAPPING PRETRIAL INJUSTICE, https://pretrialrisk.com/
national-landscape/ [https://perma.cc/E2U3-E7S2]. Just six years ago, it was reported that only
twenty states used such tools. See Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 809 (2014). Federal courts, meanwhile,
must consider the Sentencing Guidelines, which set out suggested sentence ranges for federal
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form of algorithmic tool for purposes of parole decision-making.38
The federal government has recently announced an algorithmic
tool for parole decisions: Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting
Estimated Risk and Needs (PATTERN).39 The PATTERN
system was developed in response to the First Step Act of 2018,
which called for the use of risk assessment in federal parole
decisions.40 Similarly, some state statutes encourage or require
the use of these algorithmic tools,41 while in other instances
these tools are selected at the discretion of state or local judges.42
As best we can determine, only one jurisdiction
(Pennsylvania) has implemented any risk assessment tool in
criminal justice that is based on machine learning.43 Despite
offenses depending on a variety of factors—a somewhat crude, if older and nondigital style of
algorithm. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); see also
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–09 (2007) (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines
are advisory but still should play a “key role” in judges’ considerations).
38 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 77 (2007) (noting twenty-eight states were using an
algorithmic risk assessment tool for parole decision-making as of 2004).
39 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT
SYSTEM (2019), https://nij.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh171/files/media/document/ the-first-stepact-of-2018-risk-and-needs-assessment-system_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXU4-QC9D]; see also
Brandon Garrett & John Monahan, Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk Assessment in Sentencing,
JUDICATURE (Summer 2019), https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/assessing-risk-the-use-of-riskassessment-in-sentencing/ [https://perma.cc/3HUF-7YVY] (noting that the First Step Act
“mentions risk no less than 100 times”).
40 See NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 2020 REVIEW AND REVALIDATION OF
THE FIRST STEP ACT RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL 1–4 (2021), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1
/nij/256084.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LJ4-BDTJ] (discussing First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115391, § 101, 132 Stat. 5194, 5195–96).
41 See, e.g., ALA. STAT. § 12-25-33(6) (instructing the Alabama Sentencing
Commission to create an instrument to be “predictive of the relative risk that a felon will
become a threat to public safety”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007(3)(a) (“Sentencing
judges shall consider . . . the results of a defendant’s risk and needs assessment included
in the presentence investigation . . . . ”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.114(A) (allowing
for use of risk assessment tool by adjudicatory bodies in the criminal justice system);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 988.18 (requiring courts to use a risk assessment tool in
determining an offender’s eligibility for a sentence of community service); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2154.7 (requiring the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing to adopt a tool to
“be used as an aide in evaluating the relative risk that an offender will reoffend and be
a threat to public safety”); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-6(a)(2) (instructing probation officers to
“[c]onduct a standardized risk and needs assessment” of probationers); see also ARIZ.
CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. § 6-201.01(J)(3) (“For all probation eligible cases, presentence
reports shall [] contain case information related to criminogenic risk and needs as
documented by the standardized risk assessment and other file and collateral information.”).
42 See, e.g., BD. OF DIRS. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF IND., POLICY FOR INDIANA RISK
ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (Apr. 23, 2010), https://www.in.gov/judiciary/cadp/files/prob-risk-iras2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/33WW-EXG7]; R.I. DEP’T OF CORRS., LEVEL OF SERVICE INVENTORYREVISED: A PORTRAIT OF RIDOC OFFENDERS (Apr. 2011), http://www.doc.ri.gov/administra
tion/planning/docs/LSINewsletterFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MRV-LLM6].
43 See generally Richard Berk, An Impact Assessment of Machine Learning
Risk Forecasts on Parole Board Decisions and Recidivism, 13 J. EXPT. CRIM. 193 (2017).
And technically this use in Pennsylvania is by an agency, not a court: the Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole. Another state, Maryland, has apparently looked into
using machine learning for parole, but does not appear to have implemented it.
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somewhat frequent claims to the contrary in the popular
media,44 all other algorithmic tools used by courts appear to be
based on standard indices or conventional logistic regression
models—not machine-learning algorithms.
For example, one of the more popular non-learning
algorithmic tools for bail decisions, the Arnold Foundation’s
Public Safety Assessment, considers nine factors, including: the
defendant’s age; current violent offense; pending charges at the
time of the offense; prior misdemeanor, felony, and violent
convictions; prior failure to appear in the past; and prior
sentences to incarceration. It then weighs these factors in
varying proportions to determine scores from one to six that
purport to predict the defendant’s likelihood of new criminal
activity, new violent criminal activity, and failure to appear in
court, which a judge can then use in determining whether to
grant pretrial release.45
Another non-learning algorithmic tool, known as the
Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions (COMPAS), has been adopted by several state court
systems for pretrial decisions. It involves an extensive
questionnaire that covers issues such as the defendant’s prior
criminal history, compliance with probation, substance abuse,
relationships with others who have been arrested or sent to jail,
home and work environment, and personality.46 The algorithm
uses these data points to place the defendant along several “risk
scales” purporting to predict the defendant’s relative likelihood
of pretrial failure (including failure to appear and new felony
arrest after pretrial release) and recidivism.47 In deciding
whether to approve a defendant for pretrial release or in
determining an appropriate sentence, judges and other officials

44 See, e.g., Matt O’Brien & Dake Kang, AI in the Court: When Algorithms Rule on
Jail Time, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://apnews.com/article/ae7b23e20c874
800aa5746b92210a2dc [https://perma.cc/C9JF-E4ZP].
45 Risk Factors and Formulas, PUB. SAFETY ASSESSMENT, https://www.psa
pretrial.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/N3PZ-YVDJ]; see also, e.g., N.J. CTS., PUBLIC SAFETY
ASSESSMENT: NEW JERSEY RISK FACTOR DEFINITIONS 1–4 (Dec. 2018), https://njcourts.gov/
courts/assets/criminal/psariskfactor.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E5P-JM39].
46 See generally NORTHPOINTE INC., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE
(Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/Practition
ers-Guide-COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC2R-588T]. Although details
about COMPAS are proprietary, investigative journalists at ProPublica uncovered the
underlying questionnaire used in Wisconsin. See Risk Assessment, https://www.documentcloud.
org/documents/2702103-Sample-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS-CORE.html [https://perma.cc/5PN5UU6U]. Other states’ courts have adopted COMPAS as well, including Florida, Michigan, New
Mexico, and Wyoming. See Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/ [https://perma.cc/5WM7-3V8A].
47 See PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE, supra note 46.
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can take the values reached by these algorithms into account.48
For instance, the New York Appellate Division reversed the New
York State Board of Parole’s decision to deny an inmate release
on parole, finding that the decision was “irrational[] bordering
on improp[er]”—a conclusion the appellate court reached in part
by looking to the inmate’s COMPAS risk assessment, which
labeled him “‘low’ for all risk factors.”49
Yet another basic algorithmic tool, LSI-R (Level of
Service Inventory-Revised), aims to predict a defendant’s risk of
recidivism by weighing a number of factors. These factors
include criminal history, educational and employment
background, financial, mental, and familial state, substance
abuse, and other personal details.50 The Rhode Island
Department of Corrections has adopted this test, as have courts
in a number of states, including California, Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, Iowa, Oklahoma, and Washington.51
In addition to these examples of common risk assessment
algorithms, some individual states have also adopted their own
unique algorithms.52 Again, to be clear, none of these are
artificial intelligence per se, in the sense of machine-learning
algorithms. These risk assessment algorithms are instead
48 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-asoftware-programs-secret-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/B7C7-5YKA]; O’Brien & Kang,
supra note 44; Ellora Thadaney Israni, When an Algorithm Helps Send You to Prison, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/opinion/algorithm-compassentencing-bias.html [https://perma.cc/LL6P-FX9Y] (“Use of a computerized risk assessment
tool somewhere in the criminal justice process is widespread across the United States . . . . States
trust that even if they cannot themselves unpack proprietary algorithms, computers will be less
biased than even the most well-meaning humans.”).
49 Rivera v. Stanford, 172 A.D.3d 872, 876–77 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
50 Anthony W. Flores et al., Predicting Outcome with the Level of Service
Inventory-Revised: The Importance of Implementation Integrity, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 523,
524 (2006).
51 See R.I. DEP’T OF CORRS., supra note 42; Algorithms in the Criminal Justice
System, supra note 46.
52 See, e.g., BD. OF DIRS. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF IND., supra note 42; Susan Turner et
al., Development of the California Static Risk Assessment (CSRA): Recidivism Risk Prediction in
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 5–6 (U.C. Irvine Ctr. for EvidenceBased Corrections, Working Paper, 2013), https://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/2013/12/
Development-of-the-CSRA-Recidivism-Risk-Prediction-in-the-CDCR.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG
4B-KV93] (listing factors considered by the California Static Risk Assessment tool); LA.
SENTENCING COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LOUISIANA SENTENCING COMMISSION
FOR THE 2010 AND 2011 TERMS 14 (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.lcle.state.la.us/sentenc
ing_commission/2012_biannual_report_lsc_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZD2-ELCC] (noting
that Louisiana uses risk assessment tools for “both inmate management and
programming . . . for persons held in state adult correctional facilities and supervision
planning . . . for persons under probation or parole supervision provided by the Department”);
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUS. CTR., MONTANA COMMISSION ON SENTENCING 41 (Mar. 1–
2, 2016), https://csgjusticecenter.org/publications/montana-commission-on-sentencing-thirdmeeting/ [https://perma.cc/34RS-TG49] (noting the use of the Montana Offender Reentry Risk
Assessment).
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formulas developed after studying large data sets using
conventional statistical analysis, and then the formulas are
applied to inputs given for each defendant. They are not
algorithms that engage in autonomous inductive “learning” to
figure out what scores to give defendants.
Nevertheless, the existing risk assessment algorithms
used by courts in many states have not avoided scrutiny. Some
scholars, lawyers, and concerned citizens have challenged the
lack of transparency behind some of these algorithms, as some
are created by private consultants who claim commercial secrecy
protection to avoid disclosure.53 Idaho, in fact, passed a law
requiring that all pretrial risk assessment tools be transparent,
compelling the builders of these tools to make their algorithms’
inputs open to public inspection and allow criminal defendants
to request access to the calculations and data that determine
their risk assessment scores.54
Even when the parameters used in the analysis
underlying these algorithms are publicly known, the owners of
a risk assessment system will often decline to explain how
exactly the factors that go into assessing an individual’s
likelihood of recidivism or pretrial misbehavior are weighted.55
53 See, e.g., Cade Metz & Adam Satariano, An Algorithm that Grants Freedom,
or Takes it Away, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/t
echnology/predictive-algorithms-crime.html [https://perma.cc/C6PD-MBZV].
54 IDAHO CODE § 19-1910.
55 See, e.g., Judge Noel L. Hillman, The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging
the Risk of Recidivism, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/2019/winter/the-use-artificial-intelligencegauging-risk-recidivism/ [https://perma.cc/LVG2-C9C2] (“[P]redictive technology becomes
another witness against the defendant without a concomitant opportunity to test the
data, assumptions, and even prejudices that underlie the conclusion.”). Some have raised
concerns about the secrecy that the creators of these risk assessment tools maintain over
the inner workings of their products:

No one knows exactly how COMPAS works; its manufacturer refuses to
disclose the proprietary algorithm. We only know the final risk assessment
score it spits out . . . Something about this story is fundamentally wrong: Why
are we allowing a computer program, into which no one in the criminal justice
system has any insight, to play a role in sending a man to prison?
See Israni, supra note 48; see also Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger,
Procurement as Policy: Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 781, 786 (2019) (noting that “government agencies purchasing and using
[algorithmic] systems most often have no input into—or even knowledge about—their
design or how well that design aligns with public goals and values” and “know nothing
about the ways that the system models the phenomena it seeks to predict, the selection
and curation of training data, or the use of that data”). For discussion of how
governments can overcome the propensity of contractors to want to protect the secrecy
of their AI systems, see, for example, Lavi M. Ben Dor & Cary Coglianese, Procurement as
AI Governance, 2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS TECH. & SOC. 192 (2021), Hannah Bloch-Wehba,
Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1307–08 (2020), Cary Coglianese & Erik
Lampmann, Contracting for Algorithmic Accountability, 6 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 175 (2021),
and David S. Rubenstein, Acquiring Ethical AI, 73 FLA. L. REV. 747, 811–13 (2021).
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As Judge Noel L. Hillman of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey has put it, “[a] predictive recidivism
score may emerge oracle-like from an often-proprietary black
box. Many, if not most, defendants . . . will lack the resources,
time, and technical knowledge to understand, probe, and
challenge” the use of these tools.56
A widely discussed 2016 ProPublica investigation
purportedly showed that the COMPAS tool systematically found
Black defendants to be at a higher risk of recidivism than
similarly situated white defendants—even though twice as
many Black defendants designated as high-risk never actually
recidivated compared with high-risk white defendants who
never recidivated.57 The ProPublica investigation has raised
significant questions about the wisdom of integrating algorithms
into judicial decision-making.58 A more recent study by
economists Megan Stevenson and Jennifer Doleac, meanwhile,
has found that the use of an algorithmic risk assessment tool by
Virginia state court judges failed to lower incarceration or
recidivism rates and that racial disparities in sentencing
increased among the judges who most relied on the tool.59
To date, the courts have only started to grapple with the
legal implications of these kinds of findings about algorithmic
tools.60 Most prominently, in State v. Loomis, a defendant in
56 See Hillman, supra note 55; cf. Judge Stephanie Domitrovich, Artificial
Intelligence Stepping into Our Courts: Scientific Reliability Gatekeeping of Risk
Assessments, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judi
cial/publications/judges_journal/2020/winter/artificial-intelligence-stepping-ourcourts-scientific-reliability-gatekeeping-risk-assessments/#2 [https://perma.cc/6ZB2HAY9] (urging the adoption of best practices to validate risk assessment tools and ensure
their reliability).
57 See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentenc
ing [https://perma.cc/5M44-LC53]; see also Israni, supra note 48; Liptak, supra note 48;
Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes Than Random People,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/equi
vant-compas-algorithm/550646/ [https://perma.cc/5MU4-3QVL].
58 See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019)
(discussing inequities in algorithmic prediction); Cynthia Rudin et al., The Age of Secrecy
and Unfairness in Recidivism Prediction 1 (Duke Univ., Working Paper, 2019),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.00731.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL2L-J8PK] (discussing concerns
about proprietary algorithms); Anne L. Washington, How to Argue with an Algorithm:
Lessons from the COMPAS-ProPublica Debate, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 131, 154–59 (2018)
(providing a framework for evaluating the integrity of predictive algorithms). We note,
of course, that just because one (non-learning) algorithm such as COMPAS may have
problems does not mean that other algorithms might not perform better.
59 Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in
the Hands of Humans 1–6, 36 (Working Paper, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3489440 [https://perma.cc/N3UB-T76E].
60 For instance, one D.C. juvenile court judge found that a risk assessment tool
intended to predict a defendant’s risk of future violence was inadmissible at sentencing,
in part because some of the factors it considered reflected and amplified racial
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Wisconsin state court challenged the state’s use of the COMPAS
algorithm at his sentencing after he pleaded guilty.61 Loomis’s
COMPAS risk scores indicated that he had a high risk of
recidivism; at sentencing, the court relied in part on the fact that
he had been “identified, through the COMPAS assessment, as
an individual who is at high risk to the community.”62
In a post-conviction challenge to his sentence, Loomis argued
that using the risk assessment violated his due process rights to (1)
be sentenced based upon accurate information, (2) receive an
individualized sentence, and (3) avoid being sentenced on the basis
of his gender.63 The trial court denied the motion, holding that it had
“used the COMPAS risk assessment to corroborate its findings and
that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of whether
it considered the COMPAS risk scores.”64
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lower court.65
It rejected Loomis’s due process challenges, noting that the
variables that the COMPAS algorithms used were publicly
available and that the risk assessment’s outcome was based fully
on either the defendant’s answers to the questions or on publicly
available information about his criminal history.66 As a result,
the use of COMPAS complied with due process, since the
defendant had the “opportunity to verify that the questions and
answers listed on the report were accurate.”67 The court further
held that, although the use of the risk assessment tool did
involve group data, its inclusion among a mix of factors still
achieved an individualized sentence for the defendant.68 Finally,
the inclusion of gender in the COMPAS algorithm’s analysis did
not violate any due process rights absent any proof that the court
disparities; however, the judge limited his holding so it only prohibited the algorithm’s
use in that particular case. See AI NOW INST., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS 2019 REPORT 9–
10, 29 (2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8GNG-7A6V].
61 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
62 Id. at 755.
63 Id. at 757.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 761.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 764–65. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court warned lower courts
to be careful given the group-based nature of the COMPAS assessment. Id. An appellate
court in Michigan reached the same basic holding on a similar due process argument: it
found that because a trial court is not bound by a risk assessment tool’s
recommendations at sentencing and determines how heavily or lightly to weigh those
recommendations, and because a risk assessment report that incorporates information
about the population at large is “similar to the opinions of probation agents that are
routinely” considered at sentencing, the use of COMPAS does not violate a defendant’s
right to an individualized sentence. People v. Younglove, No. 341901, 2019 WL 846117,
at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2019) (per curiam).
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actually relied on gender as a factor in sentencing, since the
algorithm simply accounted for differences in recidivism rates
between men and women.69
Loomis appealed to the United States Supreme Court.70
The Court invited the Solicitor General to weigh in, often a sign
that the Court recognizes the potential significance of the case.71
The Solicitor General’s Office argued that the Court should not
grant the petition, noting that no division of authority yet
existed on the validity of the use of these algorithms and
asserting that “[t]he issues that this petition raises . . . would
benefit from further percolation.”72 Ultimately, the Court
declined to take up the case, leaving the issue of a defendant’s
due process rights when confronted with a risk assessment
algorithm yet to be settled by the nation’s highest court.73
Other litigation, though, has continued to proceed in
various state courts. In Malenchik v. State, for example, the
defendant, who had pled guilty to a felony and admitted to being
a habitual offender, challenged the trial court’s use of the results
of two risk assessment tests (one of which was the LSI-R) in
determining his sentence.74 The tests’ results indicated that
Malenchik was at high risk of recidivism.75 The Indiana
Supreme Court emphasized that Malenchik’s sentence had been
based on factors other than the risk assessments, since the trial
court had also relied on the defendant’s prior criminal history
and refusal to accept responsibility for his actions and change
See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 765–67.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4204
(June 26, 2017) (No. 16-6387).
71 See Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1240 (2017). The Solicitor General
handles all litigation on behalf of the United States in the U.S. Supreme Court. See Office
of the Solicitor General, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/osg
[https://perma.cc/M2JG-GFLN]. For discussions of the role of the Solicitor General in
influencing the Court’s docket and merits decision, see, for example, Ryan C. Black &
Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 64 POL. RSCH. Q. 765, 766 (2011) (“[W]e find strong support for [Solicitor General]
influence. Justices who completely disagree with the [Solicitor General] nevertheless
follow her recommendations 35 percent of the time, a number we take to be powerful
evidence of influence.”), and Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The
Solicitor General’s Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323,
1324 (2010) (“The U.S. Solicitor General, as the U.S. Supreme Court’s premier advocate,
has long exerted significant influence over both the Court’s case selection decisions and
its substantive decisions on the merits.”).
72 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21–22, Loomis v. Wisconsin,
2017 U.S. LEXIS 4204 (June 26, 2017) (No. 16-6387).
73 See Loomis, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4204, at *1. For a general discussion of due
process and the government’s reliance on algorithms, see Coglianese & Lehr, supra note
13, at 1184–91; Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249 (2008).
74 Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 566–67 (Ind. 2010).
75 Id.
69
70
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his behavior, and it had not used the algorithm’s output as an
independent aggravating factor.76 The court noted that such
tools are neither “intended nor recommended to substitute for
the judicial function of determining the length of sentence,” but
are instead “significant sources of valuable information for
judicial consideration in deciding whether to suspend all or part
of a sentence, how to design a probation program for the
offender, whether to assign an offender to alternative treatment
facilities or programs, and other such corollary sentencing
matters.”77 As a result, the Indiana Supreme Court held that a
trial court can properly “supplement and enhance” its evaluation
of the evidence before it at sentencing by considering the results
of a risk assessment, which can “provide usable information
based on extensive penal and sociological research to assist the
trial judge in crafting individualized sentencing schemes with a
maximum potential for reformation.”78
Another case, State v. Walls, addressed a defendant’s
right to access a risk assessment tool used during sentencing.79
The defendant Walls received a LSI-R score indicating that he
was a “high-risk, high-needs probation candidate.”80 The trial
court decided, “based on this assessment,” to sentence him to
probation supervised by community correctional officers, rather
than by court services.81 Although the defendant’s counsel asked
the court to share the LSI-R assessment report, the court refused
to do so.82 In addition to holding that this refusal contravened
Kansas law and was an abuse of discretion, the Kansas Court of
Appeals found that the trial court had violated the defendant’s
due process rights, since depriving him of the LSI-R report
“necessarily denied him the opportunity to challenge the
accuracy of the information upon which the court was required
to rely in determining the conditions of his probation.”83 Since a
defendant has a right to an “effective opportunity to rebut the
allegations likely to affect the sentence,” the trial court’s
withholding of the output of the risk assessment tool on which it
had relied in setting Walls’ sentence deprived him of due
process.84
Id. at 568.
Id. at 573.
78 Id. at 573–75.
79 State v. Walls, No. 116027, 2017 WL 2709819, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. June 23,
2017) (per curiam).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at *4.
84 Id. at *2, *4 (quoting State v. Easterling, 213 P.3d 418, 425–26 (Kan. 2009)).
76
77
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In yet another case, State v. Rogers, the question arose
as to whether a court’s failure to use a risk assessment tool in
sentencing a defendant contravened his due process rights.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia rejected the
claim because the defendant failed to enter a proper objection
at the time of initial sentencing. But Justice Loughry, in a
separate concurring opinion, argued that a risk assessment
algorithm is “merely a tool that may be used by [trial court]
judges during sentencing,” a process over which judges have
broad discretion and that courts are under no obligation to use
an algorithm.85
In addition to these cases, in a few other criminal
appeals, defendants have questioned whether prosecutors must
disclose the results of algorithmic facial recognition or risk
assessment tools to defense counsel as part of their duty to turn
over exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland.86 The
courts that have handled these cases have avoided delving into
issues concerning the algorithmic nature of any of the particular
tools, since they have concluded either that the tools were not
actually used in prosecuting the defendant or that the failure to
disclose their use did not prejudice the defendant.87
Finally, in People v. Wakefield, a defendant challenged
the admissibility of the DNA matching software used to convict
him.88 After law enforcement collected a sample of his DNA, a
private company ran it through software that compared the
defendant’s DNA to a sample from the scene of the crime using
an algorithm that relied on “a certain degree of artificial
intelligence.”89 The defendant objected to his lack of access to the
algorithm’s source code, claiming that it violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.90
Although the Appellate Division concluded that the report
reflecting the algorithm’s match between the two DNA samples
was testimonial since the analysis was conducted to further law
enforcement goals, it held that the source code was not a
declarant and rejected the defendant’s Confrontation Clause
85 State v. Rogers, No. 14-0373, 2015 WL 869323, at *2 (W. Va. Jan. 9, 2015);
id. at *4–5 (Loughry, J., concurring).
86 For a discussion of these appeals, see AI NOW INST., supra note 60, at 30.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland can be found at 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
87 See AI NOW INST., supra note 60; see also Lynch v. State, 260 So. 3d 1166,
1169–70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018), review denied, 2019 WL 3249799 (Fla. July 19, 2019).
88 People v. Wakefield, 175 A.D.3d 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
89 Id. at 160–62.
90 Id. at 165. The Confrontation Clause prohibits introduction of out-of-court
testimonial statements against a defendant unless the declarant is unavailable and the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that person. Id. at 168 (citing People
v. John, 27 N.Y.3d 294, 303 (2016), and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 657 (2011)).
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argument.91 The court acknowledged that it might be possible for
an artificial intelligence tool to be a declarant independent of its
human creator, since such algorithms involve “distributed
cognition between technology and humans,” but it ultimately
found that the system at issue operated under sufficient human
input and supervision such that the true speaker behind the
report was the algorithm’s creator.92
Although it is still early in courts’ assessment of judicial use
of algorithmic tools, it seems noteworthy that, in all the cases
decided to date that have actually wrestled with the issues, courts
appear to have taken pains to emphasize that such tools only serve
as one of multiple factors that a judge takes into account in
reaching a decision. Perhaps this suggests that, as long as humans
remain in the loop, whether with standard algorithmic tools or
even with machine-learning algorithms, courts’ use of algorithms
will continue to win approval.93
C.

Online Dispute Resolution

At the limit of courts’ exploration of the precursors to
automated decision-making, online dispute resolution (ODR)
promises eventually to take humans out of the loop. ODR has
emerged in recent years as a tool for resolving disagreements
among parties using technology, growing in part out of prior
developments in the field of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR). ADR is a term that refers to a range of methods such as
mediation and arbitration that aim to settle disputes without
the use of litigation and the court system.94 ODR mechanisms
first mimicked ADR approaches to conflict resolution before
evolving into their current forms, which harness the advantages
of technology to aid their mission.95
Id. at 168–69.
Id. at 169–70.
93 See, e.g., Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 568 (Ind. 2010) (“[T]he trial court’s
sentencing decision was clearly based on factors apart from the defendant’s LSI-R and SASSI
results . . . . The trial judge did not rely on either the LSI-R or SASSI as an independent
aggravating factor in deciding to impose more than the advisory sentence.”). See generally
Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 231 (2015); Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of
Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585 (2009).
94 See ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE 33–34 (2017);
Online Dispute Resolution Moves From E-Commerce to the Courts, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June
4, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2019/06/04/online-disputeresolution-moves-from-e-commerce-to-the-courts [https://perma.cc/5AWA-SA6M] [hereinafter
Online Dispute Resolution I]; Alternative Dispute Resolution, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://w
ww.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution [https://perma.cc/92XH-U9MM].
95 See KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 94; Online Dispute Resolution I,
supra note 94.
91
92
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The initial growth of ODR has been largely driven by the
private sector.96 Most notably, eBay and PayPal have developed
ODR systems to handle the millions of disputes that regularly
arise on their platforms from and among users.97 Realizing that
they could not afford to hire enough human mediators to resolve
all of these disputes or arrange for parties to video-conference with
each other, these companies leveraged the extensive amounts of
data they had collected on consumer behavior and usage.98 Their
ODR systems aim to prevent as many disputes as possible and to
resolve the remainder quickly and amicably. To do so, these
systems first diagnose the problem, working directly with the
complainant, and then move to direct negotiations (aided by
technology) and ultimately allow the company to decide the issue
if the parties are not able to resolve matters on their own.99 As the
success of these systems has inspired other firms to develop
similar and increasingly sophisticated programs, algorithms have
become a more prominent dispute resolution solution, allowing
companies to automate away many (if not all) of the steps of the
adjudicatory process.100 Amazon, for example, has developed
algorithms that can resolve a consumer complaint about a
defective product without requiring any human intervention.101
Some courts have also begun experimenting with ODR as
a mechanism to attempt to resolve lawsuits without requiring
the use of judicial decision-making. Although much of the
innovation in this area has occurred in other parts of the world,
dozens of state and local courts in the United States, including
in Michigan, Ohio, California, and Utah, have adopted some
form of “court ODR” in cases involving small claim civil matters,
traffic violations, outstanding warrant cases, and low-conflict
family court cases.102 What counts as an ODR system can vary
See Online Dispute Resolution I, supra note 94.
See BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 25, at 111; KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY,
supra note 94, at 34–35.
98 See BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 25, at 111; KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY,
supra note 94, at 34–35.
99 COLIN RULE & AMY J. SCHMITZ, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 37 (2017) (“Each stage acted
like a filter, with the objective being to minimize the flow of cases that made it to the
end.”); see also BARTON & BIBAS, supra note 25, at 111–15; KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY,
supra note 94, at 34–36. We note that Colin Rule helpfully describes the stages of an
ODR process using the “DNMEA” mnemonic: Diagnosis, Negotiation, Mediation,
Evaluation, and Appeal.
100 See KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 94, at 46–48.
101 Id. at 48.
102 See id. at 161–62; Online Dispute Resolution Offers a New Way to Access Local
Courts, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/fact-sheets/2019/01/online-dispute-resolution-offers-a-new-way-to-access-local-courts
[https://perma.cc/FLV8-UJA2] [hereinafter Online Dispute Resolution II].
96
97
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from a simple website that facilitates entering pleas for traffic
tickets online to an online portal for engaging in asynchronous
negotiations.103 These mechanisms are not mandatory in any
jurisdiction of which we are aware but instead are offered as an
option to avoid appearing in court. In jurisdictions with these
systems, parties are notified of the ODR option via mailings or
websites.104 Parties can access the ODR system at any time, and
with the more interactive systems they can communicate and
negotiate with each other, obtain legal information and
suggested resolutions from the system, and easily manage
electronic documents—all without having to see the inside of a
courtroom.105 These systems can usually reach resolution faster
and at a lower cost to the parties than traditional court-centered
adjudication, and they are far more accessible too.106
ODR provides an emerging avenue for litigants and
courts to engage in dispute resolution outside of the presence
of a courtroom and absent a human judge. Courts’ currently
optional ODR systems, as well as the private-sector iterations
that have inspired them, increasingly have adopted automated
processes and rely on algorithmic tools to aid in reaching what
some observers characterize as fair and low-cost solutions to
the parties’ disputes.107 As some researchers have already
begun to observe, court systems could take these algorithms to
the next level of autonomy by integrating artificial intelligence
into ODR processes, which would allow for more completely
automated forms of decision-making within the nation’s
courtrooms.108

103 See, e.g., KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 94, at 161–62; Online
Dispute Resolution II, supra note 102; see also, e.g., Online Services, SUPERIOR CT. CAL.,
CNTY. L.A., https://www.lacourt.org/online/traffic [https://perma.cc/C4V4-MCK4]; Online
Dispute Resolution (ODR) Pilot Project, UTAH CTS., https://www.utcourts.gov/small
claimsodr/ [https://perma.cc/ LD6P-7MGF].
104 See KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 94, at 161–62; Online Dispute
Resolution II, supra note 102.
105 See Online Dispute Resolution II, supra note 102.
106 See Online Dispute Resolution I, supra note 94.
107 See KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 94, at 163 (“The use of ODR in
courts is also introducing algorithms into the judicial decision-making process.”); Loïc E.
Coutelier, The New Frontier of Online Dispute Resolution: Online Divorce Mediation, AM.
BAR ASS’N (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/pub
lications/tyl/topics/dispute-resolution/new-frontier-online-dispute-resolution-on
line-divorce-mediation [https://perma.cc/A9C8-7PX2] (discussing a form of ODR
used in divorce mediation that relies on “an innovative algorithm that uses game
theory negotiation to maximize the return for divorcing couples who are dividing
assets”).
108 See generally Arno R. Lodder & John Zeleznikow, Artificial Intelligence and
Online Dispute Resolution, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 73–
94 (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab et al. eds., 2012).
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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

In contrast with the nascent digitization efforts in the
courts, which might eventually move in the direction of full use of
AI, administrative agencies have long used information
technology to support vital services and programs. In recent
years, this has included reliance on machine-learning algorithms.
Even outside of the military, intelligence-gathering, and
space exploration contexts, computers have been used for decades
by government agencies to support administration and data
management for various tasks, including tax collection and the
operation of large national benefits programs such as Social
Security and Medicare.109 The technologies used by government
have tended to lag behind those deployed in the private sector.
Federal and state agencies relied on mainframe computers, for
example, long after the personal computer revolution hit the
private sector in the 1980s, and they continue to remain behind the
innovation curve today.110 Many government computer systems
have grown quite antiquated. As of 2016, auditors reported that
three-quarters of annual federal spending on computer technology
in the United States was devoted to “legacy systems” that are
“increasingly obsolete” due to “outdated software languages and
hardware parts that are unsupported.”111
Still, the internet revolution in the 1990s did prompt
state and federal government agencies to begin to digitize many
of their services and make greater use of the worldwide web.
Initially, of course, the movement was slow. According to one
survey, by the year 2000, states had websites containing an
average of only about four automated or online governmental
services each.112 The most popular digitized service at that time
was applying for a state government job (then available in
thirty-two states).113 The second most popular was electronic
109 Harold C. Relyea & Henry B. Hogue, A Brief History of the Emergence of
Digital Government in the United States, in DIGITAL GOVERNMENT 16 (Alexei Pavlichev
& G. David Garson eds., 2004).
110 Jack Moore, The Crisis in Federal IT that’s Scarier than Y2K Ever Was, NEXTGOV
(Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2015/11/crisis-federal-it-rivals-y2k/123908/
[https://perma.cc/L8YH-2VGM]; Tod Newcombe, The Complicated History of Government
Technology, GOVERNING (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.govtech.com/computing/The-ComplicatedHistory-of-Government-Technology.html [https://perma.cc/BM69-Y498].
111 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-696T, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED TO ADDRESS AGING LEGACY SYSTEMS (2016), https://www.
gao.gov/assets/680/677454.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2AW-GUQB] (testimony of David A. Powner,
Director, Information Technology Management Issues).
112 Jane E. Fountain, The Virtual State: Transforming American Government?,
90 NAT’L CIV. REV. 241, 242 (2001).
113 Id.
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filing of income taxes (twenty-four states), and the third most
popular was the online renewal of drivers licenses (seventeen
states).114 Today, all states have these basic services digitized—
and many more services as well.
The federal government adopted the E-Government Act
of 2002 “to develop and promote electronic Government services
and processes” and “[t]o promote use of the Internet and other
information technologies to provide increased opportunities for
citizen participation in Government.”115 The E-Government Act
established a federal Office of Electronic Government, imposed
a duty on all federal agencies to make vast quantities of
government information available online, and generally
required agencies to accept online submissions of public
comments on proposed regulations.116 The federal government
has since created portals such as Regulations.gov and Data.gov
to make available massive amounts of information previously
housed in paper records or internal government computers.117
Today, the United States is regarded as among the
nations that have made considerable progress in implementing
e-government practices. According to the United Nations’
ranking of countries’ progress in e-government, the United
States places ninth among all countries for “e-government
development.”118 It also ranks first in the world for “eparticipation,” tied with Estonia and the Republic of Korea.119
These rankings suggest that, even if administrative
agencies in the United States may have been slower out of the
starting gate than the private sector in their use of information
technology, they appear ahead of many counterpart government
bodies elsewhere in the world. Administrative agencies have
also moved to digitize their operations and services much earlier
than has the U.S. court system. In this respect, administrative
agencies are well along a path that will support greater use of
machine learning.
Some agencies have undertaken targeted efforts to make
data more easily accessible for use in machine-learning
applications. For example, officials at the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation have expressly focused on developing
Id.
E-Government Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 347, § 2, 116 Stat. 2899, 2900–01.
116 Id. § 3602.
117 For discussion of these and related efforts, see WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, THE
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S COMMITMENT TO OPEN GOVERNMENT: A STATUS REPORT (2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/opengov_report.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/T8MG-GMG2].
118 U.N., UNITED NATIONS E-GOVERNMENT SURVEY 2020, at 12 (2020).
119 Id. at 120.
114
115
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“the back-end disciplines of in-memory analytics, big data, and
data quality.”120 Staff at the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) established a Data Innovation Initiative with
similar goals.121 Financial regulators have worked to create a
dedicated “legal entity identifier” to be able to link disparate
transactional and other data to the corresponding business
entities.122 The Environmental Protection Agency has built
databases that can be used to train algorithms,123 while the Food
and Drug Administration has tapped into cloud storage capacity
to give the agency the ability to analyze big data.124
Beyond these data-centered building blocks of artificial
intelligence, U.S. administrative agencies are generally lightyears ahead of the U.S. judicial system in terms of employing
algorithmic tools. After all, algorithmic tools of the traditional
statistical kind have long been a staple of administrative
decision-making, especially when agencies set policies and
regulations.125 Some government agencies, such as the U.S.
Department of Commerce, even count data collection and
analysis as among their principal responsibilities.126
As a result, it is not surprising that administrative
agencies are ahead of the courts in terms of their use of fullfledged machine-learning tools as well, something that the
courts have yet to deploy. Admittedly, the use of machine
learning within administrative agencies is not yet as extensive
120 U.S. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIC PLAN
2013–2017 (2013), https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/it_plan/BusinessTechnology
StrategicPlan2013-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NSB-UZXX].
121 See Michael Byrne, Big Data, FCC BLOG (Oct. 28, 2010, 1:06 PM),
https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2010/10/28/big-data [https://perma.cc/9HAQ-U8
QR].
122 See Matthew Reed, Legal Entity Identifier System Turns a Corner,
FINRESEARCH.GOV (July 3, 2014), https://financialresearch.gov/from-the-managementteam/2014/07/03/legal-entity-identifier-system-turns-a-corner/ [https://perma.cc/5VZD94DM].
123 See EPA’s Cross-Agency Data Analytics and Visualization Program, EPA,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160414154548/https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-in
ventory-tri-program/epas-cross-agency-data-analytics-and-visualization-program
[https://perma.cc/PB8J-UV8E].
124 See Taha Kass-Hout, FDA Leverages Big Data via Cloud Computing, FDA
VOICE (June 19, 2014), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2014/06/fda-leverages-bigdata-via-cloud-computing [https://perma.cc/9AEP-SH52]. “Big data” is a generic term
that refers to massive datasets that are analyzed using machine-learning tools. See
Chitrai Mani, How Is Big Data Analytics Using Machine Learning?, FORBES (Oct. 20,
2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/10/20/how-is-big-data-analy
tics-using-machine-learning/?sh=2eb75ab471d2 [https://perma.cc/HTL6-3KWP].
125 For more recent discussions of the use of algorithmic analysis in public
administration, see generally, for example, ROBERT D. BEHN, THE PERFORMANCESTAT
POTENTIAL: A LEADERSHIP STRATEGY FOR PRODUCING RESULTS (2014); DONALD F. KETTL,
LITTLE BITES OF BIG DATA FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2018); MONEYBALL FOR GOVERNMENT (Jim
Nussle & Peter Orszag eds., 2014).
126 See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE FIFTH RISK (2018).
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as it is in the private sector, but artificial intelligence is
beginning to emerge to assist with important administrative
functions—even though, again, we know of no example where
artificial intelligence has fully replaced human decision-making.
We also know of no comprehensive survey of all uses of
machine learning by administrative agencies at both the state
and federal levels. In 2020, however, a team of researchers from
Stanford University and New York University (NYU) completed
a multi-year effort to survey the use of machine learning by the
federal government and develop a series of case studies.127 A
research team of more than two dozen members with
backgrounds in law and computer science looked carefully
through a broad range of public sources in search of references
to possible machine-learning uses at about 140 of the largest
federal agencies, yielding a total of 157 “use cases” at sixty-four
agencies involving some reliance on artificial intelligence or
machine-learning algorithms.128 However, these examples were
not distributed evenly across agencies: the Securities and
Exchange Commission, for example, had ten distinct use cases,
while about half of the agencies in the study had none.129
Furthermore, when team members with computer science
backgrounds looked closely at each use, they could find only
about twelve percent that could be ranked as having a higher
level of sophistication,130 suggesting that “[w]hile the deep
learning revolution has rapidly transformed the private sector,
it appears to have only scratched the surface in public sector
application.”131 In a potentially promising sign, however, most of
127 See generally ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 12. In the early part of this
century, the federal Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a survey of more
than 125 federal agencies and reported that fifty-two relied on some form of “data
mining,” which the GAO defined broadly “as the application of database technology and
techniques—such as statistical analysis and modeling—to uncover hidden patterns and
subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of future
results.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL
EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 4 (2004), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-04548.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9QD-KCWN]. The GAO did not report whether any of these
applications relied on machine learning rather than traditional analytic tools.
128 The researchers searched for the use of algorithms at 142 of the largest federal
agencies, with at least 400 full-time equivalent employees each. See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra
note 12, at 15. The researchers were not able to assess algorithmic sophistication for the
vast majority of the use cases. Id. at 20. For the roughly forty percent of the tools for
which they could make a determination, they coded roughly equal shares as falling in
the “lower,” “medium,” and “higher” ranges of sophistication, with about twenty use
cases in each category. Id.
129 See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 12, at 16. The researchers found that only
sixty-four of the 142 agencies (forty-five percent) had even a single use of an algorithmic
tool. Id.
130 See supra note 128.
131 See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 12, at 20.
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the algorithms the researchers discovered had been developed
internally by staff at the agencies rather than by private
contractors, reflecting a “substantial creative appetite within
agencies.”132 Finally, the Stanford-NYU team appeared not
entirely confident that all of the use cases they found actually
entailed full machine-learning systems, as they reported “some
degree of puffery amongst agencies when they describe the
adoption of machine learning and AI tools.”133 For a majority of
the use cases, a lack of publicly available documentation
rendered the team unable to determine the exact nature of the
methods that the algorithms deployed.134
The precise stage of implementation of the systems
identified by the Stanford-NYU team varied across the cases, as
only fifty-three use cases, roughly one-third of the total, were fully
deployed, while the rest remained in the planning or piloting stages
or were only partially deployed.135 Still, the team’s finding of 157
use cases across the federal government at least suggests a
plausible upper bound of the current extent of uses of machine
learning at the federal level. Obviously, still more uses exist at the
state and local government levels. We cannot purport to chronicle
all instances of administrative machine learning in this article, but
instead we provide a range of examples to convey the variety of
uses to which machine learning is being put by various agencies
throughout the United States.
It is revealing that, among the use cases the Stanford-NYU
team identified, roughly one-third were devoted to enforcement
targeting—that is, helping to identify cases of possible fraud or
regulatory violations in a way that would then allow human
auditors or inspectors to follow up and investigate.136 The research
team also found that the policy area with the most frequent use of
AI was law enforcement, which made up roughly one-fifth of the
total use cases.137 We thus first proceed in the next section to
provide illustrative instances of machine learning used in the
context of enforcement. We then proceed with examples in
government services and program administration. Finally, we turn
to a discussion of some of the merits, controversies, and legal issues
surrounding the use of artificial intelligence in the administrative
setting. Our discussion throughout all three sections includes
Id.
Dan Ho, Remarks at the 71st Plenary Session of the Administrative Conference of
the United States (June 13, 2019) (transcript on file with authors).
134 See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 12, at 20.
135 Id. at 18.
136 Id. at 17.
137 Id.
132
133
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examples of machine learning and other algorithmic tools deployed
at the federal, state, and local levels of government.
A.

Enforcement

It is a common refrain that administrative agencies have
more problems to deal with than they have resources to solve.
Perhaps nowhere could this refrain be more accurate than in the
context of administrative enforcement. Agencies have a limited
number of auditors, inspectors, and other enforcement personnel
who must oversee a vast number of individuals and businesses
to ensure their compliance with myriad pages of laws and
regulations. The federal Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, for instance, has no more than about two
thousand inspectors who oversee more than eight million
workplaces employing about 130 million workers.138 To deploy
these limited oversight resources optimally, agencies need to
know which businesses or individuals are most likely to require
oversight. Machine-learning algorithms can provide forecasts of
the likelihood of violations, thus helping agencies allocate
resources better when deciding which regulated entities to
target for human inspection and auditing.
For example, in 2001, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) began developing machine-learning risk tools to integrate
data from prior tax records, as well as data from other
government agencies, to help it predict cases of possible tax
fraud and prioritize which taxpayers to target for auditing.139
More recently, the IRS developed a machine-learning program
that uses credit card information and other third-party data to
forecast the probability of underreporting by businesses.140
138 Commonly Used Statistics, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
https://www.osha.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html [https://perma.cc/5TEE-UZL6].
139 See JANE MARTIN & RICK STEPHENSON, RISK-BASED COLLECTION MODEL
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 142 (June 7, 2005), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05stephen
son.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FYX-CHD3]; DAVID DEBARR & MAURY HARWOOD, RELATIONAL
MINING FOR COMPLIANCE RISK 183 (June 2, 2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04debarr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5XL-GSLS].
140 See Chris Wagner et al., IRS Policy Implementation Through Systems
Programming Lacks Transparency and Precludes Adequate Review, in 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 71, 76 (2010), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2010arcmsp5_policythruprogramming
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8R6-F52Q]; U.S. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2014-20088, THE INFORMATION REPORTING AND DOCUMENT MATCHING CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
COULD NOT BE DEPLOYED (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2014reports/
201420088fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEX4-GGYT]; cf. Lynnley Browning, Computer Scientists
Wield Artificial Intelligence to Battle Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), https://w
ww.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/business/computer-scientists-wield-artificial-intelligence-to-battletax-evasion.html [https://perma.cc/PD4J-B5XU] (discussing a study that developed an artificial
intelligence tool that the IRS could use to detect certain tax shelters used by corporate entities).

820

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

The Securities and Exchange Commission similarly uses
machine learning and natural language processing to identify
potential instances of insider trading, “bad apple” investment
advisers and brokers, and accounting and financial reporting
fraud.141 Meanwhile, the federal agency that oversees Medicare
relies in part on machine-learning algorithms to help it identify
possible leads for its fraud investigators to pursue.142 Federal
immigration agencies have also increasingly relied on automated
processes in identifying, monitoring, and apprehending
immigrants who are unlawfully in the United States.143 A range of
other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Department of Labor, and the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, are currently developing or deploying algorithms
to predict regulatory infractions across a variety of policy
areas.144
Local governments have also embraced the use of artificial
intelligence to support efforts to promote regulatory compliance. The
New York City Fire Department, for example, uses machinelearning algorithms to allocate and target a limited number of
building inspectors who check for compliance with fire-related
ordinances.145 In Chicago, machine-learning tools assign health
inspections of restaurants based on algorithmic forecasts of
establishments posing the greatest risks.146
A number of state and local law enforcement authorities also
use algorithmic tools—some of which appear to be based on machine
learning—when deciding where to send general police patrols.
Starting with a widely discussed CompStat initiative in New York
City in the 1990s (which was not based on machine learning), many
141 See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 12, at 22–29; Pam Karlan & Joe Bankman,
Artificial Intelligence and the Administrative State with Guests David Engstrom and Cristina
Ceballos, STAN. LEGAL (2019), https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-legal-on-siriusxm/arti
ficial-intelligence-and-the-administrative-state-with-guests-david-engstrom-and-cristinaceballos/ [https://perma.cc/UFY8-UVLC]; David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho,
Algorithmic Accountability in the Administrative State, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 800, 816–19 (2020).
142 David Engstrom, Remarks at the 71st Plenary Session of the Administrative
Conference of the United States (June 13, 2019) (transcript on file with authors).
143 Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of
Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L. REV. 1105, 1122–34 (2013); see
also ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 12, at 30–36.
144 See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 12, at 27.
145 Brian Heaton, New York City Fights Fire with Data, GOV’T TECH. (May 15,
2015), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/New-York-City-Fights-Fire-with-Data.html
[https://perma.cc/QQ2T-HS2W].
146 Stephen Goldsmith, Chicago’s Data-Powered Recipe for Food Safety, DATASMART CITY SOLS. (May 21, 2015), https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/
chicagos-data-powered-recipe-for-food-safety-688 [https://perma.cc/K2PJ-RBH2]. Boston
developed similar restaurant-inspection algorithms through a crowdsourcing project. See
generally Edward Glaeser et al., Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments
to Improve Inspection Accuracy, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 114 (2016).
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police departments across the United States have taken a more
systematic approach to allocating law enforcement resources by
using performance metrics and data analysis.147
Today, similar “moneyballing” efforts include a variety
of predictive policing tools.148 Some of these tools help police
identify areas of a city that have a greater propensity for crime
and may merit greater police patrols. For example, the City of
Los Angeles Police Department has used a machine-learning
tool called Real-Time Analysis Critical Response (RACR).149 At
least a dozen or more cities use a vendor-developed software
called PredPol, which relies on a proprietary algorithm to
identify sections of a city that may be more prone to criminal
activity so that additional police resources can be allocated to
those areas.150 Dozens of cities have adopted another tool,
ShotSpotter, which relies on algorithms to process sounds and
alerts police to the locations of shootings based on the sound of
gunfire.151 Still other algorithmic tools, such as the New York
City Police Department’s Patternizr,152 seek to identify alleged

147 By the end of the 1990s, a third of the largest police departments in the
United States reported using a program like CompStat. DAVID WEISBURD ET AL.,
POLICE FOUNDATION REPORT: THE GROWTH OF COMPSTAT IN AMERICAN POLICING (Apr.
2004), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/James-Willis-5/publication/252109584_The
_Growth _of_CompStat_in_American_Policing/links/5579a6c808ae75363756f5ab/TheGrowth-of-CompStat-in-American-Policing.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VDJ-NQXJ].
148 For a discussion of moneyballing in the public sector generally, see
MONEYBALL FOR GOVERNMENT (Jim Nussle & Peter Orszag eds., 2d ed. 2015). For a
distinction between place-based and person-based prediction in policing systems, see
Ángel Díaz, New York City Police Department Surveillance Technology, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201910/2019_NewYorkPolicyTechnology.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L6G-W8FF].
149 Nate Berg, Predicting Crime, LAPD-Style, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/jun/25/predicting-crime-lapd-los-angelespolice-data-analysis-algorithm-minority-report.
150 Randy Rieland, Artificial Intelligence Is Now Used to Predict Crime. But Is
it Biased?, SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/
artificial-intelligence-is-now-used-predict-crime-is-it-biased-180968337/
[https://per
ma.cc/6K49-TMZF]; see also ANDREW GUTHRIE, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017); Erica Goode,
Sending the Police Before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html [https://perma.cc/2KBQ-BJSZ];
cf. United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 347 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting) (“While predictive policing programs are subject to modification and
differ in their details, they share a common premise: through smart policies, law
enforcement can affirmatively prevent crime from happening, rather than just
solve it.”).
151 Chris Weller, There’s a Secret Technology in 90 US Cities That Listens for
Gunfire 24/7, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/howshotspotter-works-microphones-detecting-gunshots-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/9AMMT22R].
152 J. Brian Charles, NYPD’s Big Artificial-Intelligence Reveal, GOVERNING
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-new-york-police-nypd-dataartificial-intelligence-patternizr.html [https://perma.cc//D3L8-5Z9Y].
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perpetrators by integrating information, detecting patterns in
crime incidents, and finding linkages between incidents.153
Recent reports indicate that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Postal
Inspection Service, and hundreds of state and local law enforcement
agencies are using facial recognition tools marketed by privatesector firms in an effort to identify criminal suspects.154 In May 2019,
San Francisco became the first major U.S. city to place restrictions
on law enforcement’s use of facial recognition and other surveillance
tools.155 In light of heightened concerns about racial discrimination
by law enforcement officers, a number of technology companies, such
as Apple, Microsoft, and IBM, announced in June 2020 that they
would halt sales of their facial recognition technologies to police
departments.156 Although a number of other providers have
continued to offer such tools to law enforcement agencies,157 a
growing number of cities such as Boston, Minneapolis, San
Francisco, Oakland, and Portland have enacted restrictions to keep
their police forces from using facial recognition technology—either
in body cameras or more generally—amid heightened concerns

153 Phil Goldstein, How Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning Helps
Public Safety Departments, STATETECH (May 3, 2019), https://statetechmagazi
ne.com/article/2019/05/how-pattern-recognition-and-machine-learning-helps-publicsafety-departments-perfcon [https://perma.cc/V83E-FNRR]; Caroline Haskins, Dozens of
Cities Have Secretly Experimented with Predictive Policing Software, VICE (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d3m7jq/dozens-of-cities-have-secretly-experimentedwith-predictive-policing-software [https://perma.cc/R8YE-44GE].
154 See, e.g., Jared Council, ICE Signs Contract with Facial Recognition
Company Clearview AI, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/icesigns-contract-with-facial-recognition-company-clearview-ai-11597452727 [https://
perma.cc/75YQ-4W3U]; Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy
as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/G3H849AS]; Jon Schuppe, How Facial Recognition Became a Routine Policing Tool in America,
NBC NEWS (May 11, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/how-facial-recogni
tion-became-routine-policing-tool-america-n1004251 [https://perma.cc/6T8A-AGT7]; Jana
Winter, Facial Recognition, Fake Identities and Digital Surveillance Tools: Inside the
Post Office’s Covert Internet Operations Program, YAHOO! NEWS (May 18, 2021),
https://news.yahoo.com/facial-recognition-fake-identities-and-digital-surveillance-toolsinside-the-post-offices-covert-internet-operations-program-214234762.html [https://
perma.cc/CS9G-744H].
155 San Francisco Ordinance on Acquisition of Surveillance Technology, No.
190110 (May 6, 2019), https://sfgov.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=7206781&GUID
=38D37061-4D87-4A94-9AB3-CB113656159A [https://perma. cc/V2S7-NETA].
156 See Jonathan Vananian, Microsoft Follows IBM and Amazon in Barring
Police from Using Its Facial-Recognition Technology, FORTUNE (June 11, 2020),
https://fortune.com/2020/06/11/microsoft-ibm-amazon-facial-recognition-police/ [https://
perma.cc/MTT6-KXJA].
157 See Jared Council, Facial Recognition Companies Commit to Police
Market After Amazon, Microsoft Exit, W ALL S T. J. (June 12, 2020), https://w
ww.wsj.com/articles/facial-recognition-companies-commit-to-police-market-afteramazon-microsoft-exit-11591997320 [https://perma.cc/X62Y-C2G8].
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about privacy violations and racial bias.158 State legislatures in
Virginia, California, New York, New Hampshire, Oregon, and
Vermont have also curbed or banned law enforcement use of facial
recognition software.159 At the federal level, a number of police
reform bills would prevent federal law enforcement agencies from
using facial recognition tools.160 Those tools, however, continue to
attract interest from government, notwithstanding the increased
scrutiny. A survey of federal agencies found that at least eighteen
agencies used facial recognition systems in 2020, and at least ten
plan to expand their use of facial recognition over the next few years,
largely for law enforcement and national security purposes.161
B.

Service Delivery and Program Administration

Just as city police departments have deployed machinelearning tools to assist with law enforcement efforts, cities are
also using machine learning to support other key governmental
functions.162 To manage a variety of algorithmic efforts, New York
City has established an entire Office of Data Analytics, which
works to integrate data from across the city and develop a variety
of “analytics tools to prioritize risk more strategically, deliver
services more efficiently, enforce laws more effectively and
increase transparency.”163 Other cities have similarly created
special offices or teams devoted to data analysis and prediction.164

158 See Sidney Fussell, The Next Target for a Facial Recognition Ban? New York,
WIRED (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.wired.com/story/next-target-facial-recognition-bannew-york/ [https://perma.cc/GPL4-8PAY]; Libor Jany, Minneapolis Passes Restrictive
Ban on Facial Recognition Use by Police, Others, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-passes-restrictive-ban-on-facial-recognitionuse-by-police-others/600022551/ [https://perma.cc/3V27-YRCJ]; see also Joseph Choi,
Officals Halting Facial Recognition System that Identified Lafayette Square Protester,
HILL (May 18, 2021), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/554118-officals-haltingfacial-recognition-system-that-identified-lafayette
[https://perma.cc/A5EH-LJCM]
(discussing discontinuation of D.C.-area facial recognition program).
159 See Denise Lavoie, Virginia Lawmakers Ban Police Use of Facial Recognition,
ABC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2021), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/virginia-lawmakersban-police-facial-recognition-76753765 [https://perma.cc/NVV4-HRRZ].
160 See Tate Ryan-Mosley, We Could See Federal Regulation on Face
Recognition as Early as Next Week, MIT TECH. REV. (May 21, 2021),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/05/21/1025155/amazon-face-recognitionfederal-ban-police-reform/ [https://perma.cc/X25Z-K9ZD].
161 U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-526, FACIAL RECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY: CURRENT AND PLANNED USES BY FEDERAL AGENCIES 10–14, 26–27 (2021),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-526.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7TX-QAJ2].
162 See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
1265, 1273–83 (2020).
163 About the Office of Data Analytics, NYC ANALYTICS, https://www1.nyc.
gov/site/operations/research/mayor-office-of-data-analytics.page [https://perma.cc/2DPV-F684].
164 See, e.g., Analytics Team, CITY OF BOS., https://www.boston.gov/departm
ents/analytics-team [https://perma.cc/F253-9AJD]; Data Science, CITY OF CHI., https://
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Los Angeles has established a Data Science Federation, a formal
partnership with local colleges and universities aiming to
promote “predictive . . . analysis that will help drive data driven
decision making within the city.”165 Similarly, Chicago worked
with a consortium of university partners to create a SmartData
Platform that helps facilitate the use of machine learning in
support of city services.166
Local governments have employed machine-learning tools
for a variety of purposes related to service delivery and program
administration. Both Chicago and Washington, D.C., are using
machine learning to optimize rodent bait placement throughout
their cities.167 In Flint, Michigan, following a major fiasco in the
management of the city’s water supply, officials have benefited
from machine-learning predictions to identify priorities for
replacing pipes contributing to lead contamination in homes
throughout the city.168 Johnson County, Kansas has used
algorithmic determinations of risk to determine how to allocate its
social service counselors and mental health professionals.169
Allegheny County in Pennsylvania has relied on machine learning
to help screen phone referrals made to the county’s child protective
services hotline for risk of future abuse or neglect and then to
assess which complaints might merit further intervention.170
Artificial intelligence is also working on the ground to help
make roadways safe. In Los Angeles, traffic lights operate
automatically based on a machine-learning system that optimizes
for congestion avoidance using data fed by a network of sensors
www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/doit/provdrs/data_sciences.html [https:// perma.cc/4P8RVQ93].
165 About Us, DATA SCIENCE, https://datasciencefederation.lacity.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/GY6V-79ZT].
166 Ash Center Mayor’s Challenge Research Team, Chicago’s SmartData
Platform: Pioneering Open Source Municipal Analytics, DATA-SMART CITY SOLS. (Jan. 8,
2014),
http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/chicago-mayors-challenge-367
[https://perma.cc/P8N7-Y7GJ].
167 Linda Poon, Will Cities Ever Outsmart Rats?, CITYLAB (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2017/08/smart-cities-fight-rat-infestations-bigdata/535407/ [https://perma.cc/3S9F-RNS5].
168 Gabe Cherry, Google, U-M to Build Digital Tools for Flint Water Crisis,
UNIV. OF MICH. NEWS (May 3, 2016), http://ns.umich.edu/new/multimedia/videos/23780google-u-m-to-build-digital-tools-for-flint-water-crisis [https://perma.cc/7WR2-W8K7].
169 Robert Sullivan, Innovations in Identifying People Who Frequently Use Criminal
Justice and Healthcare Systems, POL’Y RSCH. ASSOCS. (May 16, 2018), https://www.prainc.com/
innovations-identification-cj-healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/4UFP-JG7D].
170 RHEMA VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., DEVELOPING PREDICTIVE RISK MODELS TO
SUPPORT CHILD MALTREATMENT HOTLINE SCREENING DECISIONS 1 (2019),
www.alleghenycountyanalytics.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/16-ACDHS-26_Predi
ctiveRisk_Package_050119_FINAL-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2JT-F75K]; see also Dan Hurley,
Can an Algorithm Tell When Kids Are in Danger?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/magazine/can-an-algorithm-tell-when-kids-arein-danger.html [https://perma.cc/LJJ6-AJRG].
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in the city’s streets.171 Pittsburgh has also adopted an AI-driven
tool that has cut vehicle travel time by twenty-five percent by
optimizing the city’s traffic light system.172 Georgia is developing
a “smart highway” system that will use data obtained from
vehicles with smart sensors to detect weather and road
conditions, sharing that information with other drivers and
roadway operators to reduce traffic and prevent car accidents.173
The innovative use of data analytics by local
governments is now the centerpiece of a Data-Smart City
Solutions initiative at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy
School of Government.174 This initiative has cataloged more than
seventy-five uses of data analytics by local governments, some
but not all involving machine learning.175 Its list includes tasks
as varied as identifying children who could benefit from
mentoring programs, targeting businesses that might be
underpaying taxes, and prioritizing trees for trimming.176
Similarly, the Penn Program on Regulation’s Optimizing
Government project has chronicled local government efforts that
rely on machine learning or other predictive analytics tools.
These efforts include: early intervention academic support for
public school students; detection of problems with water
infrastructure, waste, and pollution; economic blight prevention;
detection of risks to police officers from interactions with
members of the public; and improvement of city services, public
transportation, and public health.177
171 Ian Lovett, To Fight Gridlock, Los Angeles Synchronizes Every Red Light, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/us/to-fight-gridlock-los-angelessynchronizes-every-red-light.html [https://perma.cc/S5HE-FENE]; David Z. Morris, How
Swarming Traffic Lights Could Save Drivers Billions of Dollars, FORTUNE (July 13, 2015, 4:47
PM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/13/swarming-traffic-lights [https://perma.cc/2FZU-TWN5].
172 GWANHOO LEE, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, CREATING PUBLIC VALUE
USING THE AI-DRIVEN INTERNET OF THINGS 19–22 (2021), http://www.businessofgovern
ment.org/sites/default/files/Creating%20Public%20Value%20using%20the%20AIDriven%20Internet%20of%20Things.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9HC-9ESG].
173 See id., at 26–29.
174 Data-Smart
City Solutions: Our Mission, DATA-SMART CITY SOLS.,
https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/data-smart-city-solutions [https://perma.cc/3J28-B4KG].
175 A Catalog of Civic Data Use Cases, DATA-SMART CITY SOLS. (Apr. 9, 2021),
https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/how-can-data-and-analytics-be-used-toenhance-city-operations-723 [https://perma.cc/CQ3V-K2TU].
176 Id.
177 See Uses in Government, supra note 6. We acknowledge, however, that
descriptive materials available on these various uses do not always make it entirely clear
which of these efforts involved actual machine learning versus other kinds of predictive
analytic techniques. For example, although a 2017 survey of local governments by the
National League of Cities indicated that sixty-six percent of local governments have invested
in “smart city” technologies, many of these uses include applications that likely do not involve
machine-learning algorithms in assisting with government decisions, such as “WiFi kiosks”
and “E-governance applications.” NICOLE DUPUIS & BROOKS RAINWATER, NAT’L LEAGUE OF
CITIES, CITIES AND THE INNOVATION ECONOMY: PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL LEADERS 14 (2017),
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At the federal level, predictive analytic tools, including ones
relying on machine learning, have been put to varied service-related
uses. One of the earliest uses of machine learning by the federal
government actually helped spur innovation in AI technology: the
U.S. Postal Service’s use of machine learning to support automatic
handwriting detection and mail sorting.178 In addition, scientists at
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration have relied
on machine learning for weather forecasting.179 Risk analysts at the
Environmental Protection Agency have used machine-learning
algorithms to forecast the likelihood that certain chemicals are toxic
and need further study and management.180 The Food and Drug
Administration has employed artificial intelligence to extract
information from adverse event reports about drugs.181 Similarly,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics uses machine learning to code
survey results about workplace injuries,182 and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau relies on natural language
processing to categorize and identify patterns in consumer
complaints.183 The Federal Communications Commission has
used natural language processing to analyze millions of public
comments submitted in response to its proposed net neutrality
rulemakings.184 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is
exploring how machine learning could identify existing
literature that may be novelty-defeating “prior art” to patent

https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/NLC_CitiesInnovationEconomy_pages1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8S7-4BAJ].
178 One of the first automatic techniques for detecting handwriting emerged in the late
1980s in the context of mail sorting. See Ching-Huei Wang & Sargur Srihari, A Framework for
Object Recognition in a Visually Complex Environment and Its Application to Locating Address
Blocks on Mail Pieces, 2 INT’L J. COMP. VISION 125, 125 (1988); OFER MATAN ET AL.,
HANDWRITTEN CHARACTER RECOGNITION USING NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURES (Nov.
1990), http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/publis/pdf/matan-90.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HGT-CRDE].
179 David John Gagne et al., Day-Ahead Hail Prediction Integrating Machine
Learning with Storm-Scale Numerical Weather Models (2015), https://www.aaai.org/ocs/
index.php/IAAI/IAAI15/paper/viewFile/9724/9898 [https://perma.cc/K745-MHPY].
180 Richard S. Judson et al., Estimating Toxicity-Related Biological Pathway
Altering Doses for High-Throughput Chemical Risk Assessment, 24 CHEM. RSCH.
TOXICOLOGY 451, 457–60 (2011); Robert Kavlock et al., Update on EPA’s ToxCast
Program: Providing High Throughput Decision Support Tools for Chemical Risk
Management, 25 CHEM. RSCH. TOXICOLOGY 1287, 1295 (2012); Matthew Martin et al.,
Economic Benefits of Using Adaptive Predictive Models of Reproductive Toxicity in the
Context of a Tiered Testing Program, 58 SYS. BIOLOGY REPROD. MED. 3, 4–6 (2012).
181 Impact Story: Capturing Patient Experience Through Deep Learning, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/regulatory-science-action/impact-story-captur
ing-patient-experience-through-deep-learning [https://perma.cc/QG8Q-PK39]; see also
ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 12, at 53–58.
182 Alex Measure, Machine Learning: How Bureau of Labor Statistics Did It,
DIGITAL.GOV (July 25, 2019), https://digital.gov/event/2019/07/25/machine-learning-howbureau-labor-statistics-did-it/ [https://perma.cc/YS64-3E5V].
183 See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 12, at 61–62.
184 Id. at 60–61.
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applications.185 U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses facialrecognition algorithms at airports to identify people when they
arrive in the United States from international flights.186 The
Social Security Administration uses a natural language
processing tool based on machine learning that helps flag initial
decisions adjudicating disability claims for further quality
review.187
As this review of the many public sector uses of AI makes
clear, local, state, and federal agencies have embraced the
potential that algorithmic tools have to offer, deploying these
tools in a variety of contexts to conduct their operations and
provide services to the public.188 These uses of AI systems
promise to improve aspects of governmental performance, but
they have also at times raised some legal and policy concerns.
C.

Impacts and Issues

The principal advantages of artificial intelligence in the
administrative context are similar to those in the private sector:
accuracy and efficiency.189 Machine-learning algorithms can
185 See generally Arti Kaur Rai, Machine Learning at the Patent Office: Lessons
for Patents and Administrative Law, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2617 (2019); see also ENGSTROM
ET AL., supra note 12, at 46–52.
186 See Karlan & Bankman, supra note 141 (interview with David Engstrom).
187 GERALD RAY & GLENN SKLAR, AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO ELIMINATING
BACKLOGS IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PROGRAM 31–34 (2009), http://www.crfb.
org/sites/default/files/An_Operational_Approach_to_Eliminating_Backlogs_in_the_Social_Secu
rity_Disability_Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/65BA-UELV]; Judge Paul Armstrong, Artificial
Intelligence: From Law Office to Administrative Proceedings, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/2020/winter/artificialintelligence-law-office-administrative-proceedings/ [https://perma.cc/C4Q6-RXDE] (noting that
“the Social Security Administration (SSA) has taken an active role in promoting the use of AI,
first in its appeals process and then as an aid in writing and editing its ALJ decisions
themselves”); see also Engstrom & Ho, supra note 141, at 9–11.
188 Many governments are relying on AI to help manage the inflow of contacts
from the public. Following the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, for
example, the Illinois Department of Employment Security implemented an AI system to
help manage incoming calls seeking assistance with filing unemployment benefits. Brent
Mitchell, Artificial Intelligence Can Help States Manage the Unemployment Crisis,
STATETECH (Feb. 25, 2021), https://statetechmagazine.com/article/2021/02/artificialintelligence-can-help-states-manage-unemployment-crisis [https://perma.cc/6X8RPNEH]. Other agencies have implemented AI-based chatbots to assist in fielding
inquiries from the public. Carlos Meléndez, Chatbots: The New Government Official in
the Fight Against Coronavirus, NEXTGOV (June 10, 2020), https://www.next
gov.com/ideas/2020/06/chatbots-new-government-official-fight-against-coronavirus/165
966/ [https://perma.cc/6NB2-AEU9]. For further discussion of governmental use of AI,
see DARRELL M. WEST & JOHN R. ALLEN, TURNING POINT: POLICYMAKING IN THE ERA OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2020).
189 See, e.g., CARY COGLIANESE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENTAL USE OF
MACHINE LEARNING 34–37 (2020), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Coglianese%20ACUS%20Final%20Report%20w%20Cover%20Page.pdf [https://perma.
cc/C98E-RZU6] (noting that the use of AI in governmental decision-making offers the
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make more accurate forecasts that can aid in governmental
decision-making. For example, researchers have shown that if
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency were to use a
machine-learning algorithm to assign its water pollution
inspectors instead of just identifying facilities at random to
inspect, the agency could increase the accuracy of finding
violations of the Clean Water Act by 600 percent.190 A separate
analysis of a machine-learning tool used to identify potentially
toxic chemicals showed that it could save the government nearly
$980,000 for every toxic chemical identified.191
In addition to improving the allocation of scarce
administrative resources, machine-learning systems may
eventually help reduce some of the inevitable biases and
inconsistencies that arise from human judgment.192 For example,
with the Social Security Administration’s disability
adjudications, some research suggests that human decisions
reflect racial disparities that tend to disfavor claimants of
color.193 Another study of just a single office within the Social
Security Administration found vastly disparate rates of benefits
awards, with “judge grant rates in this single location
rang[ing] . . . from less than 10 percent being granted to over 90
percent.”194 If machine-learning tools are used as substitutes
for—or even just as complements to—human decision-making,
they could potentially reduce inconsistencies and other foibles
that permeate human judgment.195
Notwithstanding this potential, the use of machine
learning in governmental settings has not escaped controversy.
potential to increase the accuracy, capacity, speed, and consistency of agencies’
decisions).
190 See generally Miyuki Hino et al., Machine Learning for Environmental
Monitoring, 1 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 583 (2018).
191 Matthew Martin et al., Economic Benefits of Using Adaptive Predictive
Models of Reproductive Toxicity in the Context of a Tiered Testing Program, 58 SYS.
BIOLOGY REPROD. MED. 3, 4–6 (2012).
192 On human biases, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW
(2011), DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., NOISE: A FLAW IN HUMAN JUDGMENT (2021), and Cary
Coglianese & Alicia Lai, Algorithm vs. Algorithm, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming).
193 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/HRD-92-56, SOCIAL SECURITY:
RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN DISABILITY DECISIONS WARRANTS FURTHER INVESTIGATION 75
(1992), https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151781.pdf [https://perma.cc/63X6-U5SJ]. See
generally Erin Godtland et al., Racial Disparities in Federal Disability Benefits, 25
CONTEMP. ECON. POL. 27 (2007).
194 TRAC, SOCIAL SECURITY AWARDS DEPEND MORE ON JUDGE THAN FACTS:
DISPARITIES WITHIN SSA DISABILITY HEARING OFFICES GROW (2011), https://trac.
syr.edu/tracreports/ssa/254/ [https://perma.cc/U5YH-DWAV].
195 See, e.g., Jon Kleinberg et al., Algorithms as Discrimination Detectors, 117
PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 30096 (Dec. 1, 2020); Sendhil Mullainathan, Biased Algorithms
Are Easier to Fix Than Biased People, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/12/06/business/algorithm-bias-fix.html [https://perma.cc/8FFD-WQCY].
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If the underlying data contain biases—which may occur if they
derive from human practices and systems that themselves
reflect biases and prejudices—then machine learning might
reify the inequities built into the data.196
For example, concerns have arisen about inherent biases
built into facial recognition algorithms, given their potential
utility for law enforcement agencies.197 A recent study by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology ran millions of
photographs obtained from government databases through
almost 200 different commercial facial-recognition algorithms.198
The study found that U.S.-developed algorithms tended to have
higher rates of false positives for Asian and Black faces than for
white ones (by a factor of between 10 and 100) and more frequent
false positives for women than for men.199
Moreover, if algorithms rely on underlying data that are
limited, or if algorithms are not designed or tested well, they
may lead to a false sense of accuracy—perhaps even making
decision-making more error-prone. For instance, Indiana’s
experiment with automating the distribution of public benefits
reportedly resulted in widespread inaccuracies that erroneously
deprived many people of public assistance.200 Another error
arising from an algorithm occurred when a man in Michigan
faced what appears to have been the first wrongful arrest caused
by a faulty facial recognition system.201
Reliance on algorithms that process large amounts of
data gives rise to other concerns. Some of these concerns center
196 For recent discussions, compare CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH
DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY
(2016), with MICHAEL KEARNS & AARON ROTH, THE ETHICAL ALGORITHM: THE SCIENCE
OF SOCIALLY AWARE ALGORITHM DESIGN (2019).
197 See Natasha Singer & Cade Metz, Many Facial-Recognition Systems Are
Biased, Says U.S. Study, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
12/19/technology/facial-recognition-bias.html [https://perma.cc/58N7-EH54].
198 NIST Study Evaluates Effects of Race, Age, Sex on Face Recognition Software,
NIST (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-study-evaluateseffects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software [https://perma.cc/NL95-K44Y].
199 Id.
200 See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS
PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 39–83 (2018). In addition, an automated digital
system for identifying unemployment insurance fraud in Michigan made tens of
thousands of false fraud accusations against unemployment insurance recipients. See
Ryan Felton, Criminalizing the Unemployed, DETROIT METRO TIMES (July 1, 2015),
https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/criminalizing-the-unemployed/Content?oid=23535
33 [https://perma.cc/8M4A-DM83]; Allie Gross, Update: UIA Lawsuit Shows How the
State Criminalizes the Unemployed, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015),
https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2015/10/05/uia-lawsuit-shows-how-thestate-criminalizes-the-unemployed [https://perma.cc/5CUR-S349].
201 See Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html
[https://perma.cc/YC3R-DL3N].
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on potential violations of privacy.202 Other apprehensions focus
on the possibility of irresponsible or oppressive governmental
actors using algorithms to abuse their power.203
In addition, in the governmental setting, these concerns
are exacerbated by the “black box” character of machinelearning algorithms, which seems to raise particular worries
about transparency and accountability. These issues have
driven calls for increased oversight over the use of algorithms in
governmental decisionmaking.204 The way that such algorithms
optimize outcomes and the solutions they support may not be
readily apparent to those whom they affect, which has suggested
to some observers either that these tools should be avoided by
government agencies or that officials should take extra steps to
explain what these algorithms do.205
Such concerns have motivated government bodies to
scrutinize more closely how they use artificial intelligence
tools—and to lay out principles that they will follow when
establishing automated decisionmaking processes. City and
local governments have begun to formulate frameworks for how
they will use AI to aid in decisionmaking.206 In addition, a
202 See, e.g., Cameron F. Kerry, Protecting Privacy in an AI-Driven World,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/protectingprivacy-in-an-ai-driven-world/ (“As artificial intelligence evolves, it magnifies the ability
to use personal information in ways that can intrude on privacy interests.”).
203 See, e.g., Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil
Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, And Justice, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 192, 192 (2019) (raising concerns about the use of “dirty data” from
corrupt, racially biased, or unlawful police practices in algorithmic tools to support
predictive policing, which can further perpetuate the biases and misbehavior inherent
in the data); Shibani Mahtani, Chicago Police Take a Page From “Minority Report,” WALL
ST. J. (May 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chicago-police-take-a-page-fromminority-report-1494581400 [https://perma.cc/S85Q-HTDB]; Ali Winston & Ingrid
Burrington, A Pioneer in Predictive Policing Is Starting a Troubling New Project, VERGE
(Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/26/17285058/predictive-policingpredpol-pentagon-ai-racial-bias [https://perma.cc/954H-9JDY]; see also United States v.
Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 344–46 (4th Cir. 2020) (Thacker, J., concurring) (highlighting the
potential for harm from predictive policing algorithms that may use data that reflects
and reinforces racial biases).
204 For instance, New York City was the first in the country to set up a task
force to oversee the use of automated decision systems by city agencies. See generally
N.Y.C. AUTOMATED DECISION SYS. TASK FORCE, NEW YORK CITY AUTOMATED DECISION
SYSTEMS TASK FORCE REPORT 5 (2019), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/adstaskforce/
downloads/pdf/ADS-Report-11192019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BCZ-C6CM].
205 See AI NOW INST., AI NOW 2019 REPORT 14 (2019), https://ainow
institute.org/ AI_Now_2019_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TAM-VFNT] (flagging a
variety of concerns about the “black box” nature of algorithms and the potential for harm
and abuse if they are used by government agencies without fully accounting for built-in
biases).
206 See, e.g., supra note 204 and accompanying text; VT. ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 16–22 (2020), https://legislatu
re.vermont.gov/assets/Legislative-Reports/Artificial-Intelligence-Task-Force-FinalReport-1.15.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7W8-8QNL].
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number of initiatives at the federal level have sought to establish
guidelines for responsible use of AI. An executive order issued in
December 2020 urges federal agencies to use AI responsibly.207
The Administrative Conference of the United States has adopted
a slate of guidelines for agencies deploying AI tools, encouraging
administrative officials to consider issues such as transparency,
bias, technical capacity, procurement, privacy, security, decisional
authority, and oversight.208 The Government Accountability
Office, for its part, has issued a detailed “accountability
framework” that identifies “key practices to help ensure
accountability and responsible AI use by federal agencies and
other entities involved in the design, development, deployment,
and continuous monitoring of AI systems.”209
Congress has encouraged additional efforts to promote
responsible use of AI in government. The AI in Government Act
of 2020 created an AI Center for Excellence within the General
207 Promoting the Use of Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Federal
Government, Exec. Order No. 13,960, 85 Fed. Reg. 78,939, 78,940–41 (Dec. 3, 2020). As
of the writing of this article, President Biden does not appear to have rescinded this
executive order. The December 2020 order followed initiatives by individual agencies to
identify and commit to standards for their own adoption of machine-learning systems.
See, e.g., OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., PRINCIPLES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (2020), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/Prin
ciples_of_AI_Ethics_for_the_Intelligence_Community.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Defense, DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adoptsethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/M8VW-RBPV].
208 Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Statement Number 20, Agency Use of Artificial
Intelligence, 86 Fed. Reg. 6616 (Jan. 22, 2021). These initiatives focus merely on government’s
own use of AI—to say nothing of how government will regulate private-sector uses. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from Russell T. Vought, Acting Director, Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies, Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence
Applications (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/M-2106.pdf [https://perma.cc/AEF9-5TE9] (setting out “policy considerations” for federal agencies’
“regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to AI applications developed and deployed outside of
the Federal government”). At the state level, California and Virginia have recently become the
first two states to adopt data privacy laws requiring companies that use consumers’ data—
including providers of AI tools—to disclose those uses and allow consumers to opt out of having
their data used. See Stephan Zoder, California’s Privacy Rights Act: What Does It Mean For Your
Organization?, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephanzoder/2021/01/28/
californias-privacy-rights-act-what-does-it-mean-for-your-organization/?sh=6a42725a1a38
[https://perma.cc/G3G4-R67S]; Cat Zakrzewski, Virginia Governor Signs Nation’s Second State
Consumer Privacy Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technolo
gy/2021/03/02/privacy-tech-data-virgina/ [https://perma.cc/R9LT-DH7M]. Efforts by government
to oversee uses of AI beyond government itself have also gained traction around the world. The
European Union has proposed a sweeping regulation that would impose a heavy regulatory
burden on all AI systems used within the bloc. See Mark MacCarthy & Kenneth Popp, Machines
Learn that Brussels Writes the Rules: The EU’s New AI Regulation, BROOKINGS (May 4, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/05/04/machines-learn-that-brussels-writes-therules-the-eus-new-ai-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/K48Z-RQ8Z].
209 U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AN
ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES AND OTHER ENTITIES (June
2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-519sp.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE7R-2BQ7].
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Services Administration and called for the Office of Management
and Budget to develop further guidance on best practices in
governmental use of AI.210 The National Artificial Intelligence
Initiative Act of 2020 instructed the National Institute of
Standards and Technology to develop a voluntary risk
management framework for the use of AI by both the public and
private sectors.211
Guidelines such as the ones that Congress has called for,
along with ones already developed, are undoubtedly welcome
because the deployment of artificial intelligence tools in the
public sector can present a number of challenges in practice.
Indeed, the use of algorithms in government already has led to
some controversies and disputes.
The public school district in Boston, for example, worked
with researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on
a machine-learning algorithm intended to inform the redesign of
school schedules and bus routes. The initial algorithm-informed
redesign, which would have changed the starting times for many
schools, was expected to save the district up to $15 million in
annual expenses and produce schedules that were healthier for
students, better for the environment, and more equitable for
minority students.212 But the system’s scheduling “overhaul was
introduced with insufficient explanation or opportunity for citizen
interaction with the model,” and it prompted a “public pushback
[that] was strong and swift.”213 The school district dropped the
proposed scheduling changes in the face of the opposition.214 It did,
however, proceed to use digital algorithms to reprogram the
specific routes traveled by the district’s buses, still saving
taxpayers considerable money on fuel costs and substantially
reducing emissions.215
In Houston, a school district ended up in court after
relying on a complex algorithm—albeit not a machine-learning
210 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, Division U,
Title I, §§ 101–105, 134 Stat. 1182, 2286–89.
211 William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021, Division E, Pub. L. No. 116-283, §§ 5001–5501, 134 Stat. 3388,
4523–47.
212 ELLEN GOODMAN, THE CHALLENGE OF EQUITABLE ALGORITHMIC CHANGE
(2019), https://www.theregreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Goodman-The-Challe
nge-of-Equitable-Algorithmic-Change.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPS9-596R].
213 Id. at 3, 7.
214 Emma Coleman, How One City Saved $5 Million by Routing School Buses
with an Algorithm, ROUTE FIFTY (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.route-fifty.com/techdata/2019/08/boston-school-bus-routes/159113/ [https://perma.cc/67UG-6DKD].
215 Sean Fleming, This U.S. City Put an Algorithm in Charge of its School Bus Routes
and Saved $5 Million, WORLD ECON. F. (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2019/08/this-us-city-put-an-algorithm-in-charge-of-its-school-bus-routes-and-saved-5-million/
[https://perma.cc/9PJR-JNGF].
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one—to rate teachers’ performance and justify the dismissal of
teachers whom the algorithm rated poorly.216 The district relied
on a private consulting firm to develop and run the algorithm,
but the firm considered its “algorithms and software as trade
secrets, refusing to divulge them to either [the district] or the
teachers themselves.”217 The teachers’ union and several
teachers filed a lawsuit against the school district, arguing that
the algorithm deprived them of procedural due process.218 The
teachers argued that, without “access to the computer
algorithms and data necessary to verify the accuracy of their
scores,” the district deprived them of their constitutional rights.
The trial court issued only an interim decision, ruling that the
procedural due process claim could possibly have merit and that
the teachers were entitled to take their case to a jury. The court
held that “without access to . . . proprietary information—the
value-added equations, computer source codes, decision rules,
and assumptions—[the teachers’] scores will remain a
mysterious ‘black box,’ impervious to challenge.”219 Although the
court recognized that the consulting firm relied on by the school
district may well have been within its rights to keep its
algorithms secret, it held that a jury could still consider whether
“a policy of making high stakes employment decisions based on
secret algorithms [is] incompatible with minimum due
process.”220 Of course, the preliminary nature of the trial court’s
decision cannot rule out the possibility that, had the matter gone
to a jury, the school officials might have been able to put forth
additional evidence that could have satisfied the teachers’ due
process rights while still protecting the firm’s trade secrets.221
A handful of other cases in recent years have similarly
raised due process and transparency concerns over states’ use of
non-learning algorithms in making decisions about individuals’
Medicaid or disability benefits. In Idaho, lawyers acting on
behalf of a group of people with developmental disabilities filed
suit against the state over reductions in Medicaid payments for
216 Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168,
1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017); see also Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 1, at 37–38.
217 Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, 251 F. Supp. at 1176–77.
218 Id. at 1171–73.
219 Id. at 1179.
220 Id. at 1179–80.
221 The case settled in October 2017; in that settlement, the school district noted that
it had already terminated the vendor of the algorithm and agreed that it would never again fire
a teacher based on a “value-added” scoring system of the kind it had used, “so long as the valueadded score assigned to the teacher remains unverifiable.” Settlement and Full and Final
Release Agreement at 1–2, Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017),
https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/settlementagreement_houston_100717.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/3V2V-NHM7].
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long-term institutional services.222 The state had relied on a
proprietary algorithm used in setting individual budgets for
claimants’ required care and in calculating Medicaid benefits.223
Idaho initially argued that the methodology used by the nonlearning algorithm was a “trade secret” and refused to disclose
it to the plaintiffs unless they signed a confidentiality
agreement.224 The court rejected that assertion, and the parties
ultimately stipulated to a preliminary injunction under which
Idaho agreed to make details about its budget calculation tool
available to participants in the program upon request.225
The West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources was also sued over its use of a non-learning
algorithm that determined Medicaid recipients’ budgets for the
care they needed.226 When the algorithmically determined
budgets resulted in significant benefits reductions for the
plaintiffs, they filed a class action against the state agency.
Because the plaintiffs had no way of knowing what criteria the
algorithm had relied on to determine their budgets and
therefore lacked meaningful opportunities to contest its
determinations, they alleged violations of due process and
sought to enjoin the use of the algorithm.227 The court agreed
and issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the algorithm’s
use, since the agency failed to disclose the algorithm’s
overarching methodology, the variables it used, or how it
weighed these variables.228 The court lifted its injunction after
West Virginia developed and made publicly available an
alternative system that relied on identifiable matrices and
allowed recipients to contest the accuracy of the variables and
the overall use of the matrices.229
222 See generally K.W. v. Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. 479, 494 (D. Idaho 2014);
Schultz v. Armstrong, No. 3:12-CV-00058-BLW, 2012 WL 3201223 (D. Idaho Aug. 2,
2012). For a discussion of this litigation, see Bloch-Wehba, supra note 162, at 1279,
1296.
223 See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 162, at 1279.
224 Id.
225 Id. In subsequent litigation, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class of similarly
situated individuals; the court granted the motion and expanded the injunction to reach the
entire class. K.W. v. Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. 479, 494 (D. Idaho 2014). On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
notices informing the plaintiffs of the reduction in their benefits as a result of the algorithm’s
determinations failed to lay out properly the agency’s rationale for the reductions. K.W. ex rel.
D.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962, 971–74, 976 (9th Cir. 2015).
226 Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-cv-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *1–4 (S.D.
W. Va. Sept. 13, 2016), modified sub nom. Michael T. v. Crouch, 2018 WL 1513295 (S.D.
W. Va. Mar. 26, 2018).
227 Id. at *4, *7–9.
228 Id. at *10–12, *15.
229 Crouch, 2018 WL 1513295, at *6–13; see also Bloch-Wehba, supra note 162,
at 1276–79.
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Individuals and advocacy groups in Arkansas, Michigan,
Oregon, and Florida have also brought similar claims alleging
constitutional or statutory process violations.230 In the majority
of these suits, the plaintiffs were at least partially successful in
obtaining either a court order in their favor or a settlement with
the state government that stopped the use of the algorithm or
required greater disclosure about its operations. It seems clear
from the Idaho and West Virginia cases that government
agencies will be on the shakiest of legal grounds when they
disclose absolutely nothing about the algorithms they use. But
both of those cases involved algorithms made up of a limited
number of fully known variables that had been assigned specific
weights.231 It remains to be seen what courts will demand that
states disclose when they rely on complex, machine-learning
algorithms that are not easily or intuitively explainable. Given
that due process calls for a balancing of factors by the courts,232
it may be that the Houston school district case comes the closest
to the potential outcomes in any future procedural due process
challenges to the administrative use of machine-learning
algorithms—where the ultimate judgment about the due process
calculus and the balancing of interests at stake will be one for a
jury to make.233
In addition to lawsuits raising procedural due process
claims, administrative agencies that rely on machine-learning
algorithms could possibly face objections based on federal
antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights
230 See, e.g., Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2016); Brandy C. v. Palmer, No.
4:17cv226-RH/CAS, 2018 WL 4689464 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2018); Order on Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, C.S. v. Saiki, No. 6:17-cv-00564-MC (D. Or. Apr. 19, 2017); Cahoo v. SAS
Inst. Inc. (Cahoo I), 322 F. Supp. 3d 772, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2018), aff’d in part, reversed in part,
912 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 2019); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d 336, 342–
43 (Ark. 2017); Bauserman v. Unemployment Ins. Agency, No. 333181, 2019 WL 6622945 (Mich.
Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2019); see also AI Now Inst., supra note 60, at 7–9; AI NOW INST., supra note
205, at 35–36; CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., CHALLENGING THE USE OF ALGORITHM-DRIVEN
DECISION-MAKING IN BENEFITS DETERMINATIONS AFFECTING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
(2020), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/2020-10-21-Challenging-the-Use-ofAlgorithm-driven-Decision-making-in-Benefits-Determinations-Affecting-People-withDisabilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/S72V-V2YU]; Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, AI
Systems as State Actors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1941, 1944–57 (2019).
231 The cases discussed in Part I of this article addressing judicial use of
algorithms are also obviously relevant to the administrative use of algorithms. Just as
here, however, none of those cases addressed any truly machine-learning algorithms.
232 Under current federal law, courts are expected to determine what
procedural due process requires by balancing three factors: the interests of the private
individual; the risk of erroneous decisions; and the interests of the government. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). For elaboration on due process
balancing in the context of algorithmic tools, see Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 1, at 40–
42.
233 As noted, the algorithm at the center of the Houston case was also not a
machine-learning one.
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Act of 1964.234 The Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fifth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment also prohibit the federal and state governments,
respectively, from engaging in intentionally discriminatory
practices. If agencies are neglectful or malicious, they could
certainly use machine-learning tools in ways that offend existing
principles of constitutional or statutory law.235
Nevertheless, although it is possible for government
agencies to deploy machine-learning algorithms in a manner
that leads to judicial disapproval, it seems likely that the
responsible use of machine learning will in most cases be
accommodated under existing principles of U.S. law.236 Agencies
obviously cannot expect to have their decisions unchallenged if
they fail to provide any information about how a machinelearning system operates. But it would seem that, so long as
agencies avoid stonewalling and provide perhaps even a
modicum of transparency, many if not most agency uses of
artificial intelligence could well withstand judicial scrutiny.237
Moreover, as AI tools generally gain more widespread use in the
private sector, it is perhaps likely that members of the public
will come to accept them more in the public sector too—if not
even to expect that governmental institutions will rely on
them.238
234 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. Title VI prohibits state and local governments that receive
federal financial assistance from engaging in practices that have disparate impacts on protected
classes. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2).
235 Other possible objections, for example, might purport to be based on the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution or on considerations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
See, e.g., Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016) (arguing that using algorithms in police
investigations could raise significant Fourth Amendment concerns that have yet to be examined
by courts); Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 55, at 782–83, 808–29 (raising the possibility that
government actions that derive from machine learning might give rise to arbitrary and
capricious claims under the APA). Even if such objections are raised, this does not mean that
they will be found valid nor, even if found valid, that they will permanently block the application
of machine learning to governmental administration. See, e.g., Steven M. Appel & Cary
Coglianese, Algorithmic Governance and Administrative Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS (Woodrow Barfield ed., 2021) (“Governmental use of machinelearning algorithms—even to automate key governmental decisions—can be readily
accommodated by current administrative law doctrines.”); Aziz Z. Huq, Artificial Intelligence
and the Rule of Law, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE RULE OF LAW (Michael Sevel ed.,
forthcoming) (“There is no reason to think that the problems besetting early adopters of a new
governance tools will persist in later adoptions.”).
236 See generally Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 1; Coglianese & Lehr, supra
note 13. For an argument that courts should demand more of the government when it
uses AI tools, see Ashley Deeks, The Judicial Demand for Explainable Artificial
Intelligence, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1829 (2019).
237 See generally Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 1.
238 See Cary Coglianese, Administrative Law in the Automated State, 150
DÆDALUS 104, 113 (2021); Cary Coglianese & Katelyn Hefter, From Negative to Positive
AI Rights, WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. (forthcoming). Public acceptance of governmental
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CONCLUSION
Although the day when a judge’s role is fully supplanted
by an algorithm is surely still one that is far in the future, if it
should ever completely arrive,239 the building blocks that could
eventually give rise to a world of increased use of artificial
intelligence by governmental entities have already started to
emerge in state and federal legal systems across the United
States. The widespread adoption of risk assessment tools in
criminal cases in courts at every level of government appears to
reflect some tentative comfort with allowing algorithms to
inform judicial decisions. Increasing digitization of records could
potentially provide courts with troves of data for artificial
intelligence programs that could analyze and possibly even
facilitate automated adjudication. The growing adoption of
online dispute resolution by some courts on an optional basis, as
well as its use by private organizations, could also eventually
make the public more comfortable with fully computerized and
automated adjudication. The opportunities for successful
application of artificial intelligence are perhaps even greater in
administrative agencies, where government officials are already
beginning to rely on machine-learning tools to inform
enforcement decisions, allocate social services, and manage
programs.
Overall, these tools appear to offer great promise. As with
any tool, of course, if they are not used with care, they may create
problems and generate conflict and litigation. Public concerns have
already arisen over the use of algorithms in facial recognition
software and in other uses in the criminal law system more
generally. The few court cases decided to date, though, do not
suggest that the judiciary will categorically disapprove of machinelearning tools—especially when they are responsibly designed and
implemented and are not kept entirely secret. It is certainly beyond
the limits of any kind of intelligence, human or artificial, to forecast
with precision what the future will hold for governmental use of
use of AI could very well also extend to the reliance on automation for judging by courts.
As Tim Wu has noted (albeit with some skepticism), “it is possible that our taste for
human adjudication might be fleeting; perhaps it is akin to an old-fashioned taste for
human travel agents.” Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of
Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2023 (2019).
239 See, e.g., Dave Orr and Colin Rule, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of
Online Dispute Resolution 10 (unpublished manuscript), http://www.newhandshake.
org/SCU/ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL6X-YRN8] (“We are still a long way away from
giving an AI Lexis-Nexis access and then asking it to serve on the Supreme Court.”); Wu,
supra note 238, at 2008 (noting that “software remains in the early stages of replacing
the law”).
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machine learning in the United States. Yet with the continued
reliance on machine learning in other spheres of life, the public
acceptability of, if not demand for, its use in the governmental
sector may only increase.

